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(GROUND)WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES:
UNLAWFULLY EXCLUDING TRIBUTARY GROUNDWATER
FROM CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & STEVEN M. THIEL**

The controversial 2015 federal rule defining “waters
of the United States”—the jurisdictional determinant
for regulation under the Clean Water Act (CWA), now the
subject of numerous lawsuits—has been attacked largely
for its alleged federal overreaching. Actually, the
rule is underinclusive, for it categorically exempted
all groundwater from CWA regulation. We think this
exclusion conflicts with the purposes, terms, and
judicial interpretations of the statute—including those
of the Supreme Court—all of which have consistently
interpreted the jurisdictional scope of the statute on
the basis of a “significant effects” test, not an
unscientific
pronouncement
based
on
administrative
convenience. We explain the case for inclusion of
tributary groundwater in this Article, even though the
impending litigation over the rule is unlikely to
address the issue.
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ......................................334
..FEDERAL AND STATE GROUNDWATER REGULATION OTHER THAN THE CWA340
A. Safe Drinking Water Act .....................340
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ......342
C. State Groundwater Regulation ................343
III. ...................................PURPOSES OF THE CWA345
A. Rivers and Harbors Act: Precursor to the
CWA .........................................345
B. The Broad Scope of the Clean Water Act ......349
C. The CWA and Regulation of Discharges into
Groundwater .................................352

* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law
School.
** J.D. 2015, Lewis & Clark Law School.

[333]

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700423

PREAUTHOR.BLUMM (DO NOT DELETE)

334

8/8/2016 8:49 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 46:2

IV.

THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”357
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes ....358
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers .............361
C. Rapanos v. United States ....................365
V.
THE 2015 REGULATORY DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES”..........................................370
A. The New Regulations .........................371
B. Adoption of the “Significant Nexus” Test ....374
VI. ..............THE GROUNDWATER EXCLUSION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW377
A. The Arbitrary Exclusion of Groundwater ......378
B. The Groundwater Exclusion and Chevron
Deference ...................................388
VII. .......................................... CONCLUSION394

“[A]ll water is interrelated and interdependent. If
groundwater were red, most streams would be various
shades of pink; if groundwater were poisoned, the streams
would also be poisoned.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike regulation of surface water pollution, no
comprehensive legal structure controls pollution of the
nation’s groundwater. Various federal statutes, such as
the
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act2
and
the
Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act,3 regulate particular
activities
affecting
groundwater,
and
state
laws
attempt to govern groundwater pollution to varying
degrees.4 But over four decades after the dawn of the
modern environmental movement5 there is no uniform

1 Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 269 Neb. 177, 183 (2005) (quoting
Richard S. Harnsberger, et al., Groundwater: From Windmills to
Comprehensive Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179, 183 (1973)).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (2012).
3 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C,
§§ 6901–6992k (2012).
4 See, e.g., THOMSON REUTERS, 50 STATE REGULATORY SURVEYS: ENVT’L. LAWS:
POLLUTION—PERMITS FOR GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER DISCHARGE (Apr. 2015)
[hereinafter, GROUNDWATER SURVEY]; see infra Part II.
5 See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xi
(2004); Chelsea
M.
Keeton, Sharing
Sustainability:
Preventing
International Environmental Injustice in an Age of Regulation, 48
HOUS. L. REV. 1167, 1173–74 (2012) (“Within a single decade, Congress
passed a slew of statutes regulating everything from waste disposal
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regulation
of
pollution
affecting
hydrologicallyconnected groundwater.
The Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) could provide
uniform protection necessary comprehensively control
an interconnected hydrologic system.).6 The Act has
always had the potential to fill this void in water
pollution control law.7 But the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has successfully declined to assert
jurisdiction over groundwater pollution,8 and the agency
did so again in its 2015 rule defining “waters of the
United States,” the key jurisdictional referent in the
statute.9 The new rule, promulgated in conjunction with
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) in June 2015, 10
and now the subject of what promises to be tortuous
litigation,11 categorically excluded all groundwater.12
to natural resources and species.”). There is of course a serious
argument that modern environmental law antedated the 1970s. See KARL
BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–
1970 (2009); Michael C. Blumm, Debunking the “Divine Conception” Myth:
Environmental Law before NEPA, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269 (2010) (reviewing
the Brooks book).
6 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387
(2012).
7 See infra Part III.
8 EPA’s resistance to regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act is not confined to groundwater pollution control. See
Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean
Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79, 81, 83 (2003) (discussing EPA’s exemption of
dams from CWA permit requirements and choice not to regulate nonpoint
sources).
9 Section 502(7) of the Clean Water Act defines “navigable waters”
as “waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), but the
statute did not attempt to define “waters of the United States.” See
generally 33 U.S.C. § 1362.
10 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,”
80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) [hereinafter “2015 Rule”].
11 At least nine lawsuits challenged the agencies’ assertion of
jurisdiction over some surface waters, and allege violations of
procedural requirements. See, e.g., North Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, No. 3:15-cv-59, 2015 WL 5060744, at *1 (D.N.D. Aug. 27, 2015)
(order granting preliminary injunction). None of the lawsuits involve
groundwater issues. The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation recently denied the federal government’s motion to
consolidate the cases in the District of the District of Columbia or
in the Southern District of Ohio. In re Clean Water Rule: Definition
of “Waters of the United States,” MDL No. 2663, 2015 WL 6080727
(J.P.M.L. Oct. 13, 2015) (order denying transfer). The District of
North Dakota enjoined enforcement of the Clean Water Rule in 13
states, North Dakota, 2015 WL 5060744 at *8, and the Sixth Circuit
issued a similar injunction applicable nationwide. In re Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015) (order granting preliminary
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Groundwater
not
protected
under
other
laws
will
therefore remain essentially unregulated.
In the preamble accompanying the 2015 rule, EPA and
the Corps explained that its exclusion of groundwater
“reflect[s]
the
agencies’
current
practice”
and
“furthers the agencies’ goal of providing greater
clarity over what waters are and are not protected
under the CWA.”13 We think this position is irrational.
There is no
historical, textual, or functional basis
for asserting jurisdiction over surface waters that are
tributary
to
navigable
waters
while
denying
jurisdiction over groundwater that is tributary to
those same surface waters. We maintain that by
categorically
excluding
groundwater,
the
agencies
jeopardize “the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters” inconsistent with the
fundamental
policy
of
the
CWA.14
Instead
of
categorically
excluding
all
groundwater
from
CWA
regulation, we contend that courts should insist that

injunction). In the latter case, oil, construction, and other trade
groups have petitioned the Sixth Circuit to reconsider en banc its
conclusion that it has original jurisdiction to hear the case. See
Katerina E. Milenkovski, Industry Groups Seek En Banc Review of Clean
Water
Act
Ruling, NAT’L
LAW
REVIEW,
March
2,
2016,
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/industry-groups-seek-en-bancreview-clean-water-act-ruling (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). Lawsuits
may not be the agencies’ only problem, as a recent Government
Accountability Office report found that some of EPA’s efforts to sell
the public on the 2015 Rule constituted illegal “covert propaganda.”
See Eric Lipton & Michael D. Shear, E.P.A. Broke Law with Social
Media Push for Water Rule, Auditor Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2015,
http://nyti.ms/1YaOeTX (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). Although unlikely
to result in civil or criminal penalties, such stories contribute to
the political firestorm surrounding the 2015 Rule. Id. The
controversy surrounding the rule has also caught the attention of the
United States Congress. A January 2016 effort to enact legislation
blocking the Clean Water Rule failed to overcome a presidential veto.
See Timothy Cama, Senate Fails to Override Obama Veto, HILL, Jan. 21,
2016,
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/266575-senatefails-to-override-obama-on-water-rule (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
12 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,114 (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
122.2).
13 Id. at 37,059.
14 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). See Rapanos v. United States, 547
U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (clarifying that
waters not navigable-in-fact are subject to CWA jurisdiction when
they “affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
[traditional navigable waters],” and the effect is more than
“speculative or insubstantial”).
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the
agencies
determine
their
jurisdiction
over
groundwater according to case-specific analyses.15
The 1972 amendments to what is now the CWA created a
nationwide program for regulating water pollution,16
employing a system of permit schemes,17 technological
requirements,18
and
discharge
limits
based
on
a
particular water’s uses.19 The Act extended regulation
to “navigable waters,” defined as “waters of the United
States,”20 although it did not define the latter terms.
EPA and the Corps proceeded to promulgate regulations
delineating the scope of “waters of the United States”
beginning in 1973.21 Largely in response to subsequent
judicial
decisions
interpreting
the
CWA
and
the
agencies’ regulations,22 EPA and the Corps proposed a
new definition of “waters of the United States” in
April 2014.23 That new definition, made final in June
2015, placed bodies of water into three different
categories: 1) those subject to federal jurisdiction by
rule; 2) those that may be jurisdictional based on a
case-specific analysis; and 3) those excluded from
federal jurisdiction by rule.24 The agencies put all

15

See infra Part VI.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
17 Id. §§ 1342, 1344.
18 See id. §§ 1311, 1316, 1317.
19 Id. § 1313 (requiring states to set water quality standards
based on a water’s “use and value for public water supplies,
propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and
agricultural, industrial and other purposes, also taking into
consideration their use and value for navigation”).
20 Id. § 1362(7).
21 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,529 (May 22, 1973) (codified at 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1994)).
22 See infra notes 248–251 and accompanying text.
23 Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean
Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188, 22,188–89 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
24 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058–59. The most significant
change in the final rule is the addition of specific limitations
placed on the definition of “adjacent waters,” restricting that term
to include only waters within a certain distance of navigable waters.
Id. at 37,058. The final rule is essentially unchanged from the
proposed rule in regards to groundwater. Compare id. at 37,059 (“The
agencies add exclusions for groundwater and erosional features.”),
with 79 Fed. Reg. 22,218 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (“The agencies
propose the following are not ‘waters of the United States’ . . .
[g]roundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface
drainage systems.”).
16
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groundwater into the third category, excluded from the
CWA’s jurisdiction.25
The rule is regrettable—-and we think unlawful—because of the important role groundwater plays in
human health, the economy, and the environment. 26
Groundwater supplies a third of the public water supply
in America’s cities and a colossal ninety percent of
drinking
water
in
rural
areas.27
In
addition,
groundwater makes up forty-two percent of the water
used on the nation’s farms and ranches.28 In addition to
its human uses, groundwater plays a critical role in
the health of other bodies of water.29 For example,
discharge
of
groundwater
into
other
ecosystems
recharges surface waters, supporting biodiversity of
plant and animal species.30 These effects constitute a
“significant nexus” between tributary groundwater and
nearby navigable, interstate, or territorial waters
under the test that Justice Kennedy endorsed in Rapanos
v. United States (Rapanos).31 We contend that this
“significant nexus” test makes the rule’s categorical
exclusion
of
groundwater
from
CWA
jurisdiction
unlawful.32
There is quite a bit of literature on groundwater
regulation, or the lack thereof.33 But this Article
25

2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059.
See U.S. Geological Survey, Water Questions & Answers: How
Important is Groundwater?, http://water.usgs.gov/edu/qa-usage-gw.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Ger Bergkamp & Katharine Cross, Groundwater and Ecosystem
Services: Towards Their Sustainable Use, INT’L SYMP. ON GROUNDWATER
SUSTAINABILITY 177, 178 (2006).
30 Id.
31 547 U.S. 715, 767 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra
Section IV.C.
32 See infra Part VI.
33 See, e.g., Philip M. Quatrochi, Groundwater Jurisdiction Under
the Clean Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma, 23 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 603, 639–43 (1996) (arguing, prior to important judicial
developments and the latest WOTUS rule, in favor of asserting CWA
jurisdiction over tributary groundwater); Jason R. Jones, The Clean
Water Act: Groundwater Regulation and the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 111–19
(1999) (opposing regulation of groundwater under the NPDES system);
Thomas
L.
Casey,
III,
Reevaluating
“Isolated
Waters”:
Is
Hydrologically Connected Groundwater “Navigable Water” Under the
Clean Water Act?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 159, 172−73 (2002) (discussing the
status of groundwater under the CWA after the SWANCC decision).
26
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argues that, although the agencies’ criteria for
determining CWA jurisdiction under the new rule are
legally and scientifically sound, groundwater that is
tributary to surface water satisfies those criteria,
and therefore should not be categorically excluded. In
this
Aritlce
we
explore
the
inconsistencies
and
contradictions of the CWA jurisdictional rule as it
pertains to groundwater.
On one hand, the agencies maintain that, in order to
fulfill their statutory obligation to protect the
waters of the United States, “[t]he entire tributary
system of the navigable waters has to be subject to the
[CWA.]”34 In addition, for the first time, the rule
provides
a
scientific
framework,
based
on
the
“significant nexus” test, for placing waters under CWA
jurisdiction.35 As discussed below, this approach to
determining the scope of CWA jurisdiction is consistent
with both case law interpreting the Act and the latest
science regarding the interconnectivity of bodies of
water.36
On the other hand, however, the agencies proceeded
to exclude from jurisdiction groundwater that may be
part
of
a
tributary
system
and
may
meet
the
“significant
nexus”
standard.37
This
exclusion
contradicts both the Act, as interpreted by numerous
courts,38
and
the
EPA
Science
Advisory
Board’s
conclusions
about
the
significant
effect
that
groundwater has on the health of surface waters. 39
Consequently, the agencies’ decision to categorically
exclude
all
groundwater
from
CWA
regulation
is
arbitrary and capricious, undermining the agencies’

34

Bruce Meyers et al., Will the New Waters of the United States
(WOTUS) Rule Float?, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10857, 10861 (2014) (quoting
Lance Wood, Assistant Chief Counsel for Environmental Laws and
Regulatory Programs at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
35 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,060.
36 See infra Section V.B.
37 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055.
38 See infra Part III.C.
39 See Letter from David T. Allen, Chair, Sci. Advisory Bd., to
Gina McCarthy, Admin., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Sci. Advisory Bd.
(SAB) Consideration of the Adequacy of the Scientific and Technical
Basis of the EPA’s Proposed Rule Titled “Definition of Waters of the
United States Under the Clean Water Act” 3 (Sept. 30, 2014),
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/
sabproduct.nsf/0/518D4909D94CB6E585257D6300767DD6/$File/EPA-SAB-14007+unsigned.pdf; see also infra note 318 and accompanying text.
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efforts to fulfill the Act’s purposes of “restor[ing]
and
maintain[ing]
the
chemical,
physical,
and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”40
This Article examines Congress’ intent in enacting
the CWA and asserts that the categorical exclusion of
groundwater from CWA jurisdiction contradicts that
intent. Part II begins by discussing the existing
patchwork of laws protecting groundwater. Part III
explains the circumstances that led to the CWA, the
lower federal courts’ jurisprudence addressing the
scope of “waters of the United States,” and the
evolution of the “significant nexus” test. Part IV
reviews the Supreme Court’s attempts to clarify the
scope of the Clean Water Act. Part V describes the new
regulatory definition of “waters of the United States”
and the agencies’ adoption of the “significant nexus”
test. In Part VI we conclude that reviewing courts
should strike down the rule’s categorical exclusion of
groundwater from CWA jurisdiction and instead require
jurisdictional determinations to be a function of casespecific application of the “significant nexus” test.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE GROUNDWATER REGULATION OTHER THAN THE CWA
Before turning to the CWA, we briefly discuss other
federal and state laws regulating the contamination of
groundwater. The Safe Drinking Water Act41 and Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act
provide
the
most
noteworthy
federal
regulation
of
groundwater.
Unfortunately, Congress did not intend either of these
laws to comprehensively protect groundwater, and they
do not.42 At the state level, regulation varies wildly
among jurisdictions.43 These inconsistent protections
fail
to
prevent
groundwater
contamination
in
an
interconnected hydrologic system.
A. Safe Drinking Water Act
Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
“to assure that the water supply systems serving the
40

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. (2012).
See infra Part II.A (discussing groundwater protections under
the Safe Drinking Water Act); Part II.B (discussing groundwater
protections under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
43 See infra Part II.C (discussing state level regulations).
41
42
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public meet minimum national standards to protect
consumers from harmful contaminants.”44 In addition to
authorizing drinking water standards, the SDWA created
three
programs
that
do
supply
some
groundwater
protection. The first two, the wellhead injection
program45 and the sole source aquifer demonstration
program,46 require states to create plans to prevent
contamination of public water systems and aquifers that
are the sole or primary source of drinking water for an
area. States can then apply for federal funds to share
the cost of implementing the plans.47
The underground injection control (UIC) program is
the third way in which the SDWA protects groundwater.48
This program allows the federal government or approved
states to issue permits for underground injection of
fluids
consistent
with
regulations
that
“contain
minimum requirements for effective programs to prevent
underground injection which endangers drinking water
sources.”49 The protection provided by the UIC program
is hardly comprehensive, however. The regulations
implementing
the
program
include
exceptions
for
activities
that
may
have
significant
effects
on
groundwater. For example, most of the fluids and
propping agents used in hydraulic fracking operations
related to oil and gas production are expressly
exempted from regulation under the program.50 Further,
aquifers that are technologically or economically
impractical for current use for drinking water supply
are specifically exempted from regulation.51
One commentator long ago described the SDWA as the
nation’s
“strongest
protection
against
groundwater
contamination.”52 But the protections provided in each
of the SDWA’s programs are limited to groundwater that

44 H.R.
REP. NO. 104-632, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1366, 1370.
45 SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a) (2012).
46 Id. § 300h-6.
47 Id. § 300h-6(j).
48 Id. § 300h(b)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 146 (2015).
49 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) (2012).
50 Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B).
51 40 C.F.R. § 146.4 (2015).
52 Linda A. Malone, The Necessary Interrelationship Between Land
Use and Preservation of Groundwater Resources, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1, 18 (1990).
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supplies a public water system.53 That narrow focus
excludes many groundwater resources from protection,
despite the effects they may have on surface waters to
which they are connected. In addition, the UIC
program’s exemption for fracking fluids is increasingly
significant, as that method of oil and gas production
becomes more widespread.54
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
aims to “promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and
energy resources.”55 Congress sought to accomplish this
goal by regulating the generation, transport and
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. 56
Generators must determine if their waste is hazardous.57
Both generators and transporters must track hazardous
waste and its movement to a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility.58 In order to operate, such a
facility must have a permit from EPA or an authorized
state agency.59
Facility permits include design standards, operating
requirements, closure and post-closure requirements and
groundwater monitoring requirements.60 If waste from the
facility is contaminating groundwater, the owner or
operator must take corrective action and monitor the

53 42 U.S.C. § 300g (“Subject to sections 300g-4 and 300g-5 of this
title, national primary drinking water regulations under this part
shall apply to each public water system in each State.”); id.
§ 300f(4) (defining a “public water system” as one having “at least
fifteen service connections” or “regularly serv[ing] at least twentyfive individuals”).
54 See generally ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON & JOHN RUMPLER, ENV’T AM. RESEARCH &
POLICY CENT., FRACKING BY THE NUMBERS: KEY IMPACTS OF DIRTY DRILLING AT THE STATE
AND
NATIONAL
LEVEL
(2013),
available
at
http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports
/EA_FrackingNumbers_scrn.pdf (discussing the key impacts of fracking
on drinking water contamination).
55 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2012).
56 Id. §§ 6922–6924.
57 Standards Applicable to Generators of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R.
§ 262.11 (2014).
58 40 C.F.R. § 262.20 (2014).
59 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (2012).
60 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 264 (2014); id. §§ 264.97–264.99
(groundwater monitoring requirements).
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success of those efforts.61 RCRA plays an important role
in preventing groundwater contamination. However, its
protections are narrowly focused on hazardous waste as
defined in the statute.62 Unfortunately, RCRA does
nothing to protect groundwater from the numerous other
types of pollution.
C. State Groundwater Regulation
State regulation of groundwater contamination is a
tangled web of statutes and common law providing
varying degrees of protection. Most state groundwater
regulation focuses on ownership and allocation issues.63
States that regulate discharges into groundwater often
do so as part of the responsibilities delegated to them
under the federal SDWA,64 which focuses only on
groundwater that is or can be used as a source of
municipal
drinking
water.65
Some
states
regulate
discharges
into
groundwater
as
part
of
their
administration
of
the
CWA’s
National
Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).66 In order for a

61

Id. § 264.100.
RCRA addresses groundwater monitoring only in the case of a
hazardous waste leak. See id. § 264.1. Regulated hazardous wastes are
listed and described at id. §§ 261.31–261.33.
63 In fact, drought-ridden California passed three such laws in
2014 alone, amending numerous sections of the state’s Government and
Water Codes. Assemb. B. 1739, 2013–2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 1168,
2013–2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 1319, 2013–2014 (Cal. 2014). See
also Jeremy B. White, Historic California Groundwater Regulations
Head
to
Gov.
Jerry
Brown,
SACRAMENTO
BEE,
Aug.
29,
2014,
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/
article2608207.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
64 See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-6-8-.01 (2015) (“[T]he purpose
of this Chapter [is] to establish rules and procedures which will
enable the State to administer . . . applicable Federal laws,”
including the SDWA); see generally GROUNDWATER SURVEY, supra note 4
(finding that state regulations “often mirror federal permitting
guidelines” on groundwater or surface water management); SALLY BENJAMIN
& DAVID BELLUCK, STATE GROUNDWATER REGULATION: GUIDE TO LAWS, STANDARDS AND RISK
ASSESSMENT
188–89
(1994)
(identifying
Connecticut’s
groundwater
classification standards as subject to “primary and secondary
standards of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act”). See also 42
U.S.C. § 300g–2 (2012) (providing that if, in the view of the EPA
Administrator, a state has met the listed conditions, it will have
“primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems”).
65 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
66 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012) (allowing states to gain authority to
administer the NPDES program within their jurisdictions). Currently,
62
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state to gain approval to manage the NPDES program
within its borders, the Act requires, among other
things, that the state have “adequate authority . . .
[t]o issue permits which . . . control the disposal of
pollutants into wells.”67 However, EPA considers this
provision satisfied if the state has been approved to
administer the SDWA.68 Unfortunately, groundwater that
is unlikely to be used as a public source of drinking
water remains unregulated under the SDWA and CWA.
Some states regulate groundwater pollution as part
of their NPDES programs in the same manner they
regulate surface water pollution.69 In these states, a
pollutant
cannot
be
lawfully
discharged
into
groundwater without a permit requiring compliance with
water quality standards and effluent limitations. 70 Most
states, however, have chosen to apply NPDES regulations
only to “waters of the United States” as defined in the
CWA,71 which, under the new definition of that term,
categorically excludes groundwater.72 A third category
of states regulate discharge into groundwater under
other state laws.73 As a result, the extent of
groundwater
protection
in
these
states
varies

45 states are partially or fully authorized. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency,
NPDES
Program
Authorizations,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-10/documents/state_npdes_program_status.pdf.
67 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) (2012).
68 40 C.F.R. § 123.28 (2015) (“State law must provide authority to
issue permits to control the disposal of pollutants into wells. . . .
A program approved under section 1422 of SDWA satisfies the
requirements of this section.”)
69 See,
e.g., 5 COLO. CODE REGS. 1002-61:61.8(2)(b)(ii) (2015)
(Colorado), 7 DEL. ADMIN. CODE 7201-3.0 (Delaware), OR. ADMIN. R. 340045-0010(20) (2015) (Oregon) (defining permits and discharges of
pollutants into groundwater that require permits); see also GROUNDWATER
SURVEY, supra note 4 (comparing the different permit requirements
across 50 states for groundwater pollutant discharge).
70 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012) (stating requirements for
permit approval under the NPDES program); OR. ADMIN. R. 340-045-0015
(2015).
71 See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 15.120 (2006) (Alaska);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-423, 22a-427 (2013) (Connecticut); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 12-5-22 (2012) (Georgia); see also GROUNDWATER SURVEY, supra note 4
(showing the various permit requirements for groundwater discharge
and listing state statutes that contain NPDES regulations).
72 See infra Part V.
73 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 376.30 (2015) (noting that it is the
intent of the statute to “support and complement applicable
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act”).
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significantly. Because the hydrologic system connects
groundwater to other waters, a lack of protection in
one state may leave other waters vulnerable to
contamination.74
III. PURPOSES OF THE CWA
In contrast to the narrowly focused federal laws and
inconsistent state laws discussed above, Congress
intended the CWA to have broad, uniform application. 75
The Act aimed to protect traditional navigable waters
and their tributaries, interstate waters, and the
territorial seas by regulating discharges into any body
that would significantly affect any of those waters.76
We first provide evidence of Congress’s intent by
analyzing the context in which it enacted the modern
CWA in 1972. Then, we review the early case law that
recognized the Act’s broad scope before explaining how
courts have interpreted the CWA’s applicability to
groundwater.
A. Rivers and Harbors Act: Precursor to the CWA
The substance of the CWA was greatly influenced by
its predecessor, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
(RHA),77
which
directed
the
Corps
to
protect
navigation.78 The evolution of the Corps’ interpretation
of the RHA prior to 1972 provides important background
as to Congress’s intent in enacting the CWA.79
Invoking its authority under the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause,80 Congress enacted the nineteenth

74

NAT’L GROUND WATER ASS’N, GROUNDWATER PROTECTION 1 (2015); Ludwik A.
Teclaff, Principles for Transboundary Groundwater Pollution Control,
22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1065, 1066 (1982).
75 118 CONG. REC. 33,757 (1972).
76 See infra Part III.B.
77 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–
467n (2012).
78 Id.
79 For an in-depth discussion of the RHA’s relationship to the CWA,
see Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National
Water Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands,
69 N.D. L. REV. 873 (1993). For an explanation of the evolution of
federal navigability regulation, see Robert W. Adler, The Ancient
Mariner of Constitutional Law: The Historical, Yet Declining Role of
Navigability, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1643, 1651–84 (2013).
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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century RHA in order to prevent obstructions in the
nation’s navigable waters.81 Among other provisions, the
RHA included section 13, known as the Refuse Act, 82
which prohibited the unpermitted discharge or placement
of “any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever” into “any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water.”83 As discussed below, the Refuse Act
was the model on which Congress based the CWA’s
discharge regulation.84
The Corps originally focused RHA enforcement
on
preventing activities that would result in physical
impediments
to
the
navigational
capacity
of
jurisdictional waters.85 Beginning in the mid-1960s,
however, judicial interpretations of the RHA led the
Corps to apply the Refuse Act well beyond regulating
obstructions to navigation. For example, in United
States v. Standard Oil Co.,86 the Supreme Court ruled
that the RHA’s prohibition on the discharge of “any
refuse matter” into the navigable waters of the United
States included commercially valuable oil accidently
spilled, which expanded the jurisdiction of the statute
in two ways.87 First, the Court broadly construed the
term “refuse” to include “anything which has become
81 See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201
(1967) (explaining that the RHA is “an assertion of the sovereign
power of the United States” pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
82 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012).
83 Id. (emphasis added).
84 Lester Edelman, Remarks at Utility Executive Roundtable: Effect
of the Refuse Act Program on the Clean Water Act of 1972 (Apr. 21,
2013),
available
at
http://www.dawsonassociates.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013-4-22-EDELMAN-REMARKS.pdf.
85 See, e.g., Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. United States, 266 U.S.
405, 429 (1925) (concluding that Congress intended the RHA to apply
to any activity that obstructed navigable capacity); United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485, reh’g denied, 363 U.S. 858
(1960) (reversing the Court of Appeals and holding that the discharge
of fine particles into a tributary of the Mississippi River, thus
raising the river bed, violated the RHA); Wyandotte Transp. Co., 389
U.S. at 200–01 (1967) (affirming the lower court’s ruling that the
United States may recover costs for removing a negligently sunken
ship that obstructed navigation in violation of the RHA).
86 384 U.S. 224 (1966). The Supreme Court considered this case on
direct appeal from the Middle District of Florida. Id. at 224. The
district court had dismissed the indictment of Standard Oil, and the
Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 225, 230.
87 Id. at 226; 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012) (emphasis added).
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waste, however useful it may earlier have been.” 88
Second, the Court interpreted the legislative history
to indicate that Congress meant the Refuse Act to
remedy harms “caused in part by obstacles that impeded
navigation and in part by pollution.”89 After Standard
Oil, pollution prevention became a basis for regulation
and enforcement under the RHA.90
That
the
RHA
provides
protection
against
environmental harm was clarified in Zabel v. Tabb.91
There, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the Corps
acted consistent with the RHA when it denied a permit
to fill a jurisdictional water based solely on
ecological concerns.92 The court concluded that the
Corps could deny a fill permit under the RHA based on
reasons other than navigability.93 In fact, the court
ruled that the Corps must consider other government
policies,94 including those in the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act95 and the National Environmental Policy
Act96 in making regulatory decisions. Thus, as Congress
began considering what was to become the CWA, the RHA
was the nation’s principal water pollution prevention
program. In fact, the House Committee on Government
Operations praised the Corps for its conservation
efforts and urged the agency to take an even stronger
position, imposing on permit applicants the burden of

88 Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 229 (1966) (quoting United States
v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1952)).
89 Id. at 228–29 (emphasis added).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1992)
(citing 33 C.F.R. § 209.330(a)) (discussing 1968 amendments to Army
Corps
regulations
administering
the
RHA
which
called
for
consideration of the effects of, among other things, pollution when
the Secretary issues permits).
91 430 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910
(1971).
92 Id. at 203.
93 Id. at 214 (reversing the district court).
94 Id. at 211 (“The Secretary must weigh the effect a dredge and
fill project will have on conservation before he issues a permit
lifting the Congressional ban.”).
95 16 U.S.C. §§ 661–666c (2012) (requiring the Corps to consult
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service prior to issuing a permit).
96 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370h (2012) (requiring the Corps to evaluate the environmental
effect of a proposed action and consider alternatives prior to
issuing a permit).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700423

PREAUTHOR.BLUMM (DO NOT DELETE)

348

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

8/8/2016 8:49 AM

[Vol. 46:2

showing that proposed fills of waterways would not harm
the environment.97
In the wake of the Zabel decision, President Nixon
moved quickly to codify the Corps’ policy of weighing
environmental interests when considering a dredge or
fill application under the RHA.98 In a 1970 Executive
Order issued soon after Zabel, the President directed
the Corps and EPA to implement a permit program under
the RHA “to regulate the discharge of pollutants and
other refuse matter into the navigable waters of the
United States or their tributaries and the placing of
such matter upon their banks.”99 The Corps responded to
the order by proposing new rules establishing a permit
program to regulate both direct and indirect discharges
into navigable waterways and their tributaries.100
Mirroring the language of the RHA, the rule allowed
the Corps to issue permits for “discharges or deposits
into navigable waters of the United States or into any
tributary from which discharged or deposited matter
shall float or be washed into a navigable water.”101 This
language reflected the Corps’ intention to regulate
both navigable and nonnavigable waters. The regulations
required the Corps, after consulting with EPA, to base
permit decisions on “an evaluation of the impact which
the discharge or deposit may have on . . . applicable
water quality standards and related water quality
considerations” and “fish and wildlife values not
reflected in or adequately protected by applicable
water quality standards, if any.”102 But before the Corps
could implement this rule, a federal court thwarted the
Corps’ effort.

97 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-917, at 2, 6 (1970) (approving the Corps’
regulation of water pollution). The Zabel court cited this House
Report in support of its holding. 430 F.2d at 214 n.28 (“As the
Committee views it, not only should the Corps consider conservation,
but it should consider conservation to be endangered by every dredge
and fill project and place the burden of proving otherwise on the
applicant.”).
98 Exec. Order No. 11,574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627, 19,627–28 (Dec. 25,
1970).
99 Id. at 19,627.
100 See Permits for Discharges or Deposits into Navigable Waters, 35
Fed. Reg. 20,005 (Dec. 31, 1970) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209).
101 Permits for Discharges or Deposits into Navigable Waters, 36
Fed. Reg. 6,564 (Apr. 7, 1971) (emphasis added).
102 Id. at 6,566.
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In Kalur v. Resor,103 the federal district court for
the District of Columbia considered an environmentalist
challenge to the Corps’ decision to issue permits
allowing
deposit
of
refuse
into
nonnavigable
waterways.104 The environmentalists claimed that the RHA
prohibited the deposit of refuse into both navigable
waters and their tributaries, but allowed the Corps to
issue permits for deposit only in navigable waters.105 By
issuing permits to deposit refuse in a nonnavigable
water, they claimed that the Corps and EPA exceeded
their authority under the RHA.106 The court agreed that
the RHA’s language limited the Corps’ authority to
issue permits for discharges into navigable waters. 107
The decision stifled the Corps’ efforts to use the RHA
as a comprehensive program to control national water
pollution and prompted Congress to create an entirely
new permit program that would allow the agencies to
regulate
discharges
into
tributaries
as
well
as
navigable waters.108
B. The Broad Scope of the CWA
Congress responded to the Nixon Executive Order, the
Corps’ 1971 regulations, and their demise in the Kalur
decision by enacting the landmark 1972 CWA.109 In doing
so, Congress intended the scope of the new law to be at
least as broad as the reach of the rule invalidated in
Kalur, which reached both navigable waters and their
nonnavigable
tributaries.110
The
first
courts
to
interpret the statute’s terms of “navigable waters” and
103

335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
Id. at 3–4.
105 Id. at 4.
106 Id.
107 Id.
at 10–11 (referencing 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1971) (“[T]he
Secretary of the Army ‘may permit the deposit of any material above
mentioned in navigable waters.” (emphasis in original)).
108 See Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands
Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence,
Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
695, 702, 702 n. 34–35, 704 (1989); Kalen, supra note 79, at 886–88.
109 See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 110, at 702, 702 n.34–35; Kalen,
supra note 79, at 886–87; see also CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2012)
(“Discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters subject to the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1910 . . . shall be regulated pursuant to
this chapter, and not subject to such Act of 1910 . . . except as to
effect on navigation and anchorage.”).
110 See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 110, at 704.
104
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“waters of the United States” recognized this broad
purpose, concluding that Congress aimed to protect the
traditional navigable waters partly by regulating
discharges into other bodies that flowed into and
affected those traditional navigable waters.111 These
early
jurisdictional
interpretations
based
on
downstream
effects
would
provide
the
basis
for
subsequent decisions that recognized CWA jurisdiction
over interconnected groundwater,112 and which later would
evolve into the “significant nexus” test adopted by the
Supreme Court.113
Among the important first-generation CWA cases was
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.,114 in
which the Sixth Circuit decided that the Act’s
regulation on the discharge of pollutants extended
beyond waters that are navigable-in-fact to include
nonnavigable tributaries, and that this broad reach was
consistent with the Commerce Clause.115 The Ashland court
concluded, after analyzing the statutory language, that
“Congress’ clear intention as revealed in the Act
itself was to effect marked improvement in the quality
of the total water resources of the United States,
regardless of whether that water was at the point of
pollution a part of the navigable stream.”116 The court
gave
two
reasons
that
the
Act’s
regulation
of
nonnavigable tributaries was within Congress’ powers

111

See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d
1317, 1329 (6th Cir. 1974) (discussed infra notes 115–122 and
accompanying text); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668
(M.D. Fla. 1974) (discussed infra notes 123–24, 126 and accompanying
text); United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th
Cir. 1979) (discussed infra notes 123, 125–26 and accompanying text);
Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114, 117 (D. Wyo. 1977) (agreeing
with “[t]he opinions of courts in numerous other cases . . . that
Federal jurisdiction under the [CWA] extends beyond waters which meet
the traditional tests of navigability”); Weiszmann v. Dist. Eng’r,
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 526 F.2d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir. 1976)
(affirming the Corps’ assertion of CWA jurisdiction over a canal in
part because “it would be impossible to dredge the canal through
without causing sediment to enter [a] pre-existing canal. The impact
upon navigable waters through the fact of this connection is
sufficient to establish a violation of [the CWA]”).
112 See infra Part III.C.
113 See infra Part IV.
114 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
115 Id. at 1323, 1330 (upholding the district court’s decision that
CWA jurisdiction extended to tributaries).
116 Id. at 1323 (emphasis added).
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under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution: 1) pollution of the nation’s
waters presented a threat to public health and welfare,
which were “proper subjects for Congressional attention
because of their many impacts upon interstate commerce
generally”117; and 2) “water pollution is also a direct
threat to navigation.”118
The Sixth Circuit observed that pollution flowing
through nonnavigable tributaries to navigable waters
can create hazards that threaten commerce.119 Thus,
limiting Congress to regulating only navigable streams
would “make a mockery” of the Commerce Clause power,
allowing tributaries to “be used as open sewers as far
as federal regulation was concerned.”120 In short, the
court decided that Congress aimed to protect the health
of traditional navigable waters by regulating not only
those waters but also other waters that affected
navigable waters, and that regulating such nonnavigable
waters was not beyond the reach of the Constitution’s
commerce power.121
The Ashland court’s broad interpretation of the
CWA’s regulation of “navigable waters” was echoed in
ensuing cases,122 many of which cited legislative history
in making their determinations. For example, the Middle
District of Florida relied on legislative history to
conclude
that
mangrove
wetlands,
although
not
navigable-in-fact, were “navigable waters” as defined
by the CWA.123 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit cited
legislative history in holding that a small creek that
was incapable of transporting people or goods was a
“navigable water” subject to regulation under the Act. 124
Both courts noted that Congress changed the early
definitions
of
“navigable
waters”
to
remove
a
navigability requirement.125

117

Id. at 1325.
Id.
119 Id. at 1326 (citing as examples fires on rivers in Michigan and
Ohio).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1322–23, 1325–27.
122 See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D.
Fla. 1974); United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375
(10th Cir. 1979).
123 Holland, 373 F. Supp. at 667–68, 671–72.
124 Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d at 375.
125 See Holland, 373 F. Supp. at 672; Earth Sci., 599 F.2d at 375.
118
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In addition to removing the word “navigable” from
the definition of “navigable waters,” the Senate Public
Works Committee interpreted the phrase to include all
interconnected waters:
The control strategy of the Act extends to navigable
waters. The definition of this term means the navigable
waters
of
the
United
States,
portions
thereof,
tributaries thereof, and includes the territorial seas
and the Great Lakes. Through a narrow interpretation of
the definition of interstate waters the implementation
1965 Act was severely limited. Water moves in hydrologic
cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants
be controlled at the source. Therefore, reference to the
control requirements must be made to the navigable
waters,
portions
thereof,
and
their
tributaries.126Although these cases concerned surface
tributaries, they established that Congress intended the
Act to apply to nonnavigable waters in order to protect
the quality of the entire hydrologic cycle.127 We argue
below that a scheme aimed at controlling pollution at its
source must regulate groundwater that significantly
affects navigable waters.

C. The CWA and Regulation of Discharges into
Groundwater
In affirming that a tributary was in fact a “water
of the United States,” many courts based their
decisions on whether the discharged pollutant would
make its way through the hydrological cycle into a
traditional navigable or interstate water.128 This
connection to those waters, not the type of waterbody
into which the initial discharge was made, was the
determinant of CWA jurisdiction.129 The first courts to
consider whether “waters of the United States” included
groundwater
adopted
and
refined
this
“downstream
effects” analysis.
For example, in United States v. Phelps Dodge
Corp.,130 the federal government alleged that the

126 S. REP. NO. 92–414, at 77 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3742–43 (cited with approval in Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504
F.2d at 1329).
127 Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1329.
128 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
130 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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corporation violated the CWA by discharging a pollutant
into an arroyo which, when it contained water, flowed
into groundwater.131 The federal district court of
Arizona decided that “[t]he intention of Congress was
to eliminate or to reduce as much as possible all water
pollution throughout the United States both surface and
underground.”132 In order to fulfill this purpose, the
court ruled that the definition of “waters of the
United States” must include:
[A]ny waterway within the United States also including
normally dry arroyos through which water may flow, where
such water will ultimately end up in public waters such
as a river or stream, tributary to a river or stream,
lake, reservoir, bay gulf, sea or ocean either within or
adjacent to the United States.133

The Phelps Dodge court was the first to apply the
“downstream effects” test to subsurface water, but it
would not be the last.
In Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Train,134 the Eastern
District of Kentucky applied the “downstream effects”
analysis to groundwater, although the court used new
terms that presaged the “significant nexus” test
adopted in the 2015 rule’s definition of “waters of the
United States.”135 EPA had revised Kentucky’s proposed
water quality standards so they would apply to all
“waters of the United States” in the state.136 Rejecting
a
group
of
businesses’
challenge
to
the
EPA’s
interpretation, the court held that the CWA
authorized
and
required
the
Administrator
of
the
Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate water
quality standards for waters of the United States as
defined by the [CWA] . . . which includes any subsurface
waters having a clear hydrological nexus with those

131

See id. at 1182, 1187.
Id. at 1187.
133 Id. (emphasis added).
134 No. 74–16, 1976 WL 23662 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 1976).
135 Id. at *2; see infra Part V. The new definition asserted
jurisdiction over some waters based on the “significant nexus”
analysis developed in later cases, consistent with the reasoning of
Justice Kennedy in the Rapanos decision. See infra notes 230–243 and
accompanying text.
136 Train, 1976 WL 23662, at *1.
132
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Not only did this decision add support for the view
that tributary groundwater was jurisdictional under the
CWA, the court’s use of the term “nexus” would later be
embraced by the Supreme Court.138
By tying CWA jurisdiction of groundwater to its
effect on surface waters, Phelps Dodge and Kentucky
suggested that groundwater without a connection to, and
thus without a significant effect on, surface waters
was not a “water of the United States.” The Southern
District of Texas first addressed this situation in
United States v. GAF Corp.,139 where the federal
government sought to enjoin GAF from using deep wells
for the injection of organic chemical wastes.140 The
court held that these injections were not a violation
of section 301(a) of the CWA’s prohibition on “the
discharge of any pollutant”141 because the groundwater at
issue “ha[d] not been alleged to flow into or otherwise
affect surface waters,” and therefore was not a “water
of the United States.”142 Later, in Exxon Corp. v.
Train,143
the
Fifth
Circuit
reversed
an
EPA
administrative decision, rejecting EPA’s attempt to
regulate discharges of waste water into 5,000-foot deep
wells.144 Neither party claimed that the groundwater at
issue was hydrologically connected to any surface
water, and the court explicitly withheld judgment as to
EPA jurisdiction over groundwater that was connected. 145
By
distinguishing
between
tributary
and
isolated
groundwater.
These
courts
suggested
that
their
conclusions might have been different had groundwater
been hydrologically connected to jurisdictional surface
waters.

137

Id. at *2 (emphases added).
See infra Part IV.
139 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
140 Id. at 1383.
141 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970).
142 GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. at 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
143 554 F.2d 1310, 1313 (5th Cir. 1977).
144 Id. at 1312–13.
145 Id. at 1312 n.1 (“EPA has not argued that the wastes disposed of
into wells here do, or might, ‘migrate’ from groundwater back into
surface
waters
that
concededly
are
within
its
regulatory
jurisdiction. We mean to express no opinion on what the result would
be if that were the state of the facts.”).
138
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Other courts have taken a narrower view of “waters
of the United States.” Instead of adopting the
“downstream effects” analysis in the cases discussed
above, some
decided that the Act did not authorize
regulation
of
discharges
into
any
groundwater,
regardless of whether there was a connection to surface
waters.146 These courts relied mainly on snippets of
legislative history that conflicted with most of that
history and with the purpose of the Act.147 One piece of
widely cited legislative history was a failed amendment
proposed by Congressman Aspin of Wisconsin that would
have
expressly
included
groundwater
within
the
definition of “waters of the United States.”148
The Aspin Amendment would have brought “ground water
into the subject of the bill, into the enforcement of
the bill,”149 but was ultimately rejected.150 As the
Senate Committee on Public Works explained, Congressman
Aspin’s amendment and other similar proposals were not
adopted
“[b]ecause
the
jurisdiction
regarding
groundwaters is so complex and varied from State to
State.”151 Instead, the final bill required that each
state show in its application to administer the NPDES
program that it had authority to impose affirmative
controls over the injection of any pollutants into
wells that may affect groundwater. 152 Some courts seized
on this legislative history to conclude that the CWA
rejected regulation of all groundwater.153
Courts relying on this legislative history lost
sight of the forest for the trees. The failure of the
146 See, e.g., Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. United States, 618 F.
Supp. 1103, 1107 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
147 See, e.g., id. at 1105–06; Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. DaytonHudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing legislative
history in affirming the district court’s holding that even
groundwater with a hydrologic connection to surface “waters of the
United States” is not regulable under the CWA).
148 118 CONG. REC. 10,666 (1972), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 589 (1973) (remarks of
Rep. Aspin).
149 Id.
150 S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Aspin),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739.
151 Id.
152 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
153 See, e.g., Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. United States, 618 F.
Supp. 1103, 1107 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (The “unmistakably clear
legislative history” demonstrates that Congress did not intend the
CWA to extend federal regulatory authority over groundwater).
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Aspin Amendment does not counter the text of the
statute and other legislative history that weighs in
favor of federal authority to regulate groundwater if
it
is
hydrologically
connected
to
jurisdictional
surface waters.154 Other considerations likely influenced
the members of Congress who voted against the Aspin
Amendment,
since
it
would
have
extended
federal
authority beyond interconnected groundwater to include
groundwater
isolated
from
surface
waters.155
The
amendment would have also deleted an exception from the
CWA’s definition of “pollutant” for gas, water, or
other materials injected into wells as part of oil and
gas production.156 The amendment’s opponents were likely
more concerned with the amendment’s effect on isolated
groundwater and the oil and gas exception than with
tributary groundwater regulation.157
Courts that have read the Act and its history to
preclude federal regulation of tributary groundwater
have ignored Congress’s express purpose in enacting the
CWA. From the earliest opinions interpreting the scope
of “navigable waters” and “waters of the United
154 See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306 (1988)
(“This Court generally is reluctant to draw inferences from Congress’
failure to act.”).
155 See Philip M. Quatrochi, Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the
Clean Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 603, 617 (1996) (“Several commenters have suggested that the
oil and gas provisions rather than the inclusion of groundwater
caused the Aspin Amendment’s demise. Furthermore, members of Congress
simply may have assumed that groundwater was implicitly included in
the definition of ‘navigable water’ in section 402, making the Aspin
Amendment unnecessary.”).
156 See
id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012) (The term
“pollutant” does not mean “water, gas, or other material which is
injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water
derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in
a well” if certain conditions are met.).
157 For more discussion of the Aspin Amendment, see U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 853 n.66 (7th Cir. 1977), overruled in part
by City of W. Chi., Ill. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d
632, 644 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The debate on this amendment clearly
demonstrates that it was intended to ‘eliminate the inconsistency
between the way we treat oil companies in this bill and the way we
treat other companies. Oil companies and other industries can pollute
ground water, through the operation of what are called ‘waste
injection wells.’’” (quoting Rep. Aspin, 118 CONG. REC. 10,666
(1972))); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text (where the
Kelley court cited the “unmistakably clear legislative history” to
show that Congress did not intend the CWA to extend federal
regulatory authority over groundwater).
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States,” federal courts have recognized congressional
intent to define the terms broadly.158 Numerous courts
quickly
established
that
hydrologically
connected
groundwater could be included among jurisdictional
waters.159 Although the case law is not unanimous, the
majority of courts considering the text, history, and
purposes of the Act concluded that regulation of all
interconnected
waters
is
essential
to
protecting
traditional navigable waters.160 With this substantial
body of case law established in the lower courts, in
1985 the Supreme Court began to weigh in with its
interpretation of “navigable waters” and “waters of the
United States.”161
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES”
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the scope of
“navigable waters” in cases that all concerned the
statute’s application to wetlands.162 The case analyses,
however, are applicable to groundwater because they
examine
the
same
statutory
language,
intent,
legislative history, and applicable regulations.163 This
Part reviews the Supreme Court’s efforts to determine
the meaning of “navigable waters,” as intended by
Congress. Although the Court has refined the outer
limits of CWA jurisdiction, the decisions largely
represent the logical development of the existing case
law described above, since the “significant nexus” test
that emerged bears a striking similarity to the
158

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130–145 and accompanying text.
160 See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C (showing that “the first
courts to interpret the statute’s terms of ‘navigable waters’ and
‘waters of the United States’ recognized this broad purpose and
concluding that Congress aimed to protect the traditional navigable
waters partly by regulating discharges into other bodies that flowed
into and affected those traditional navigable waters,” and that
“[t]he intention of Congress was to eliminate or to reduce as much as
possible all water pollution throughout the United States both
surface and underground”).
161 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
126 (1985).
162 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cnty. v. United States (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2005) (plurality opinion).
163 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123–24; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162–
67; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722–26.
159
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“downstream effects” analysis employed by the first
courts to consider the scope of CWA jurisdiction. In
short, the Supreme Court’s opinions did nothing to
undermine the argument that “waters of the United
States” includes groundwater having a significant
effect on jurisdictional surface water.
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
(Riverside Bayview), the Supreme Court attempted for
the first time to interpret the limits of “navigable
waters” as defined by the CWA.164 The federal government
filed suit after Riverside Bayview began filling a
wetland about a mile from the shore of Michigan’s Lake
St. Clair.165 The government alleged that Riverside
Bayview’s property was a wetland abutting a traditional
navigable water was an “adjacent wetland” within the
Act’s jurisdiction under the Corps’ regulations.166 The
district court ruled in favor of the Corps, but the
Sixth
Circuit
reversed,
holding
that
the
Corps
regulation at issue must be read narrowly to avoid
constitutional takings concerns.167 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that
the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction was a reasonable
interpretation of the agency’s CWA authority.168
The Court’s Riverside Bayview analysis echoed the
approaches of many of the lower courts in the cases
discussed above.169 Instead of asking whether the
164

474 U.S. at 126.
Id. at 124.
166 Id.; The Corps rule at issue imposed CWA regulation on wetlands
which were “adjacent” to a body of navigable water. Id. The Corps
defined such wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated
by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions.” Id.; 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978) (now codified under the
2015 Rule at 33 C.F.R. § 328(c)(4) (2015)).
167 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391,
397–98 (6th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
168 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 126, 135 (“[W]e cannot say that
the Corps’ judgment on these matters is unreasonable, and we
therefore conclude that a definition of ‘waters of the United States’
encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over
which the Corps has jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of
the Act.”).
169 See supra Part III.C.
165
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wetlands were themselves navigable-in-fact, the Court
focused on the interaction between the wetlands and the
adjacent navigable waters.170 The Corps had determined
that the wetlands at issue “may serve to filter and
purify water draining into adjacent bodies of water,
and to slow the flow of surface runoff into lakes,
rivers, and streams and thus prevent flooding and
erosion.”171 Those effects on surface waters showed that
the wetlands were “integral parts of the aquatic
environment”
and
“inseparably
bound
up
with
the
‘waters’ of the United States.”172 Based on those
connections, the Corps asserted CWA jurisdiction over
the Lake St. Clair wetlands.173 The Court concluded that,
in light of Congress’s expansive aims for the CWA, the
Corps’ ecological judgment provided an adequate basis
for determining that “adjacent wetlands” were “waters
of the United States.”174
By approving the Corps’ ecological-based approach to
its jurisdiction, the Riverside Bayview opinion could
be interpreted to sanction regulation of groundwater
under the CWA. The Court gave significant deference to
the Corps’ conclusion that the interaction between
“adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in
reasonable proximity to other waters of the United
States” and the adjacent navigable water justified
federal
jurisdiction.175
The
basis
of
the
Corps’
assertion of jurisdiction was that the wetlands at
issue were “adjacent wetlands” due to their ecological

170

Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
172 Id. at 134–35.
173 Id. at 130–31. The Lake St. Clair wetlands met both the Corps’
definition of “wetlands” and the Corps’ definition of “adjacent,”
because the property was “characterized by the presence of vegetation
that requires saturated soil conditions” and was in close proximity
to the Lake. Id.
174 Id. at 134 (“In view of the breadth of federal regulatory
authority
contemplated
by
the
Act
itself
and
the
inherent
difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the
Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and
their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal
judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the
Act.” (emphasis added)).
175 Id. at 134 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (July 19, 1977)). Note
that, unlike the Corps’ broad interpretation due deference in
Riverside Bayview, the agencies’ exclusion of groundwater is not
consistent with the CWA’s purposes. See infra notes 302–04, 370–71
and accompanying text.
171
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relationship to Lake St. Clair, a navigable water, to
which they were “in reasonable proximity.”176 Neither the
Corps nor the Court suggested that a surface water
connection was necessary between the wetland and the
adjacent navigable water to produce the requisite
ecological relationship to be in reasonable proximity.177
After Riverside Bayview, numerous courts continued
to
conclude
that
groundwater
with
a
sufficient
interaction with traditional navigable or interstate
waters could be “waters of the United States”178 and thus
jurisdictional under the CWA. For example, in Inland
Steel Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,179 the
Seventh
Circuit
considered
whether
a
company’s
discharge of waste into wells required an NPDES
permit.180 Affirming the district court, the Seventh
Circuit declined to recognize jurisdiction over the
well at issue because it was convinced that “the waters
at the bottom of these wells are not connected to
surface waters.”181 Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Colorado
Refining
Co.,
environmentalists
alleged
that
the
company violated the CWA by discharging pollutants into
groundwater
flowing
into
a
jurisdictional
stream

176 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124, 134. For a more detailed
discussion of this point, see United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251,
266–69 (4th Cir. 1997) (Payne, J., concurring).
177 See generally Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 129 (discussing
sufficiency of groundwater saturation to bring an area within the
category of wetlands). Although it appears that no court had
explicitly required such a connection, some courts had suggested such
a condition in dicta. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that some
water soaked into the ground and flowed through aquifers to the
navigable water, but holding that another, surface connection was the
basis for its decision.).
178 See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 901
F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he legal concept of navigable
waters might include ground waters connected to surface waters—though
whether it does or not is an unresolved question.”); McClellan
Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1196
(E.D. Cal. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir.
1995) (In order to bring groundwater within the NPDES program,
plaintiffs “must establish that the groundwater is naturally
connected to surface waters that constitute ‘navigable waters’ under
the [CWA].”); Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428,
1434 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that CWA regulation of discharge of
pollutants applied to tributary groundwater).
179 901 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1990).
180 Id. at 1421–22.
181 Id. at 1423.
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without a permit.182 The federal district court of
Colorado
concluded
that
the
Act
prohibited
the
unpermitted discharge of pollutants into groundwater
that flowed into a traditional navigable or interstate
water and ruled in favor of the Sierra Club. 183 These
courts
clearly
interpreted
Riverside
Bayview
to
sanction
the
exercise
of
CWA
jurisdiction
over
hydrologically connected groundwater.
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers
Sixteen years after Riverside Bayview, the Supreme
Court heard a new challenge to the Corps’ definition of
“waters of the United States.” In Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(SWANCC),184 the Court placed limits on the scope of the
Corps’ authority under the CWA.185 Yet, as in Riverside
Bayview, the Court actually did nothing to weaken the
argument in favor of regulating tributary groundwater
under the CWA.
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
(SWANCC), a coalition of local governments in suburban
Chicago, chose to place a solid waste disposal site at
an abandoned sand and gravel pit.186 The site contained
excavation trenches that had evolved into permanent and
seasonal
ponds
that
had
“developed
a
natural
character.”187 Prior to any fill activity taking place,
the Corps asserted jurisdiction over the ponds and
denied SWANCC a CWA section 404 permit.188 The Corps
determined that the ponds, although isolated from
navigable or interstate waters, were “waters of the
United States” by virtue of their use by migratory
birds,189 relying on a “migratory bird rule” it
promulgated in 1986.190 That rule stated that the Corps’
authority to regulate under the Act extended to
182

Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1429.
Id. at 1434 (“[T]he Clean Water Act’s preclusion of the
discharge of any pollutant into ‘navigable waters’ includes such
discharge which reaches ‘navigable waters’ through groundwater.”).
184 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].
185 Id. at 167.
186 Id. at 162–63.
187 Id. at 164.
188 Id. at 164–65.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 164.
183
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intrastate waters used as habitat by birds protected by
the migratory bird treaties,191 migratory birds which
cross state lines, or endangered species.192
The Cook County agency challenged this assertion of
federal jurisdiction, and the district court ruled in
favor of the Corps, deciding that the Commerce Clause
allows for regulating wetlands based on the cumulative
effects that their degradation could have on migratory
birds which affect the commerce of observing, hunting,
and
trapping
those
birds.193
The
Seventh
Circuit
affirmed, agreeing with the district court that harm to
migratory birds was a sufficient basis for CWA
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.194 The Seventh
Circuit also concluded that the Corps’ interpretation
conformed to the intent of Congress, which expected the
CWA to reach “as many waters as the Commerce Clause
allows.”195
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, 5-4, deciding
that the ponds at issue were not in fact “waters of the
United States,” and the Corps’ migratory bird rule was
“not fairly supported by the CWA.”196 The Court majority,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, explained
that Congress had not intended the CWA to regulate
waters to the full extent of the Commerce Clause
powers.197 Consequently, the agencies implementing the
191 Such treaties are codified through the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012).
192 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51
Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986), quoted in SWANCC, 531 U.S.
at 164. All three types of birds have some sort of federal
protection. Id.
193 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 998 F. Supp. 946, 952 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
194 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999).
195 Id. at 851 (citations omitted); see also S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at
144 (1972) (“The conferees fully intend that the term navigable
waters be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be
made for administrative purposes.”); H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131
(1972) (“The Committee fully intends that the term ‘navigable waters’
be
given
the
broadest
possible
constitutional
interpretation
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be
made for administrative purposes.”).
196 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
197 Id. at 174. In order to reject the Corps’ position that its
jurisdiction extended to the limits of the Commerce Clause, the Chief
Justice had to completely ignore the clear legislative history cited
in note 195 to the contrary (express statements by both the
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CWA could not regulate an isolated body of water based
solely on an attenuated connection to or effect on
interstate commerce.198 Instead, in order for the
statutory term “navigable” to have some meaning, the
Court
thought
that
Congress
meant
to
base
CWA
jurisdiction on “its traditional jurisdiction over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which
could reasonably be so made.”199 This conclusion was
consistent with the majority of courts that have
considered the definition of “waters of the United
States,” including the Supreme Court in Riverside
Bayview, because it focused the jurisdictional inquiry
on the interaction between the waterbody at issue and a
connected jurisdictional water.200
the SWANCC majority emphasized that “[i]t was the
significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable
waters’ that informed [the Court’s] reading of the CWA

Conference and Senate Committee Reports). Instead, the Court narrowly
interpreted the CWA “to avoid the significant constitutional and
federalism questions” that would arise if the Corps’ position were
accepted. Id. On the other hand, SWANCC’s four-member dissent
interpreted “waters of the United States”
to dispense with any
requirement that a water be actually or potentially navigable. Id. at
174. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, CWA jurisdiction could be based
on any sufficient connection to interstate commerce, not just a
connection to a navigable waterway. Id. at 181.
198 Id. at 173–74 (majority opinion).
199 Id. at 172. The Court explained that, despite downplaying the
importance of the word “navigable” in its Riverside Bayview opinion,
the word “has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional
jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or
which could reasonably be so made.” Id.
200 Some courts had extended jurisdiction over an isolated water
based solely on indirect interstate commerce grounds. See, e.g.,
United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979)
(holding that an isolated stream is a “water of the United States”
based on its use in irrigation and the presence of trout and beaver).
However, most courts based their decisions either wholly or partially
on a physical interaction constituting a “significant nexus” between
the water feature at issue and a nearby traditional navigable or
interstate water. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding jurisdiction over
normally-dry arroyos due to the presence of both surface and
subsurface connections to a jurisdictional stream); Friends of Santa
Fe Cty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1356 (D.N.M. 1995)
(“Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Arroyo is a tributary of, or
at least a conduit of water to, an interstate watercourse, even if
only on a sporadic basis.”).
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in Riverside Bayview Homes.”201 The Court found such a
nexus in its unanimous Riverside Bayview opinion
because, by draining into jurisdictional waters, the
adjacent wetlands may have “serve[d] to filter and
purify water,” “slow the flow of surface runoff into
lakes, rivers, and streams,” and “serve significant
biological functions.”202 Thus, according to the Court,
the
adjacent
wetlands
in
Riverside
Bayview
“function[ed]
as
integral
parts
of
the
aquatic
environment.”203 But there was no indication that the
ponds at issue in SWANCC served any
ecological
functions; thus, they lacked the requisite “significant
nexus” to a jurisdictional water to place them within
the scope of the CWA.204 Consequently, the SWANCC
majority did not disturb the Riverside Bayview opinion,
and its requirement of a “significant nexus” between
the water in question and another nearby jurisdictional
water remained the test of CWA jurisdiction.205
Some federal courts had already decided that
groundwater isolated from jurisdictional surface waters
was beyond the reach of the Act.206 The SWANCC majority
essentially applied that jurisdictional limitation to
surface waters, as the Court rejected the Corps’
attempt to regulate based solely on the fact that the
isolated
wetlands
had
an
effect
on
interstate
201

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985).
203 Id. at 135.
204 In SWANCC, the Corps asserted jurisdiction based on three
criteria: “(1) the proposed site had been abandoned as a gravel
mining operation; (2) the water areas and spoil piles had developed a
natural character; and (3) the water areas are used as habitat by
migratory bird [sic] which cross state lines.” See SWANCC, 531 U.S.
at 164–65 (citations omitted).
205 Id. at 171.
206 See, e.g., United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383
(S.D. Tex. 1975) (“The disposal of chemical wastes into underground
waters which have not been alleged to flow into or otherwise affect
surface waters does not constitute a ‘discharge of a pollutant’
within the meaning of [CWA] § 1311(a).”); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554
F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that Congress did not
intend to include hydrologically isolated groundwater among the
“waters of the United States,” but specifically declining to express
a jurisdictional opinion where a hydrologic connection allegedly
existed). See case discussions, supra notes 139, 143 and accompanying
text; see also Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F.
Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (stating that courts that have
considered whether isolated groundwater is included as waters of the
United states agree that it is not).
202

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700423

GROUNDWATER_AUGUST 2016 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/8/2016 8:49 AM

(GROUND)WATERS OF THE U.S.

365

commerce.207 In doing so, the majority reiterated that
the nature of a waterbody is not the only determinant
of jurisdiction; its effect on and interaction with
downstream navigable waters is also a factor. After
SWANCC, courts continued to apply the “downstream
effects” analysis first developed in early cases like
Ashland 208 and Phelps Dodge,209 and refined by the
Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview.210 Some courts
considered the status of groundwater and, although not
always
finding
jurisdiction,
they
applied
the
“significant nexus” test as they would have for any
other type of waterbody.211 Clearly, these courts did not
interpret
SWANCC
to
prohibit
regulation
of
hydrologically connected groundwater as “waters of the
United States.”
C. Rapanos v. United States
Five years after deciding SWANCC, the Court took up
the limits of CWA jurisdiction again in Rapanos v.
United
States,
two
consolidated
cases
involving
wetlands
over
which
the
Corps’
asserted
CWA
jurisdiction.212 Without first obtaining a permit, the
Rapanos plaintiffs backfilled the lands—-referred to by
Justice Scalia in his plurality opinion as “saturated
fields”213—-and the United States filed enforcement

207

See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1326
(6th Cir. 1974); see discussion supra notes 114–121 and accompanying
text.
209 United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D.
Ariz. 1975); see discussion supra notes 130–133 and accompanying
text.
210 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (discussed supra note 168–174 and
accompanying text).
211 See, e.g., Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 270–72
(5th Cir. 2001) (applying a significant nexus-type analysis but
finding the nexus insufficient to assert jurisdiction over the
groundwater); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, No. C0104686WHA, 2004 WL 201502, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2004) (applying
a significant nexus-like analysis and concluding that the aquifer at
issue was sufficiently connected to a navigable river to be a
tributary of that river); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp.
2d 1169, 1178–79 (D. Idaho 2001) (ruling that allegations of
discharges into groundwater that migrate to surface waters were
sufficient to support a CWA citizen suit).
212 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (plurality opinion).
213 Id. at 719–20.
208
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proceedings.214 The plaintiffs in both cases claimed that
the Corps lacked jurisdiction, but the district court
ruled in favor of the agency,215 and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.216 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed
the
Sixth
Circuit
in
three
splintered
opinions.217
The Court’s opinions—-Justice Scalia for a fourmember plurality; Justice Kennedy concurring in the
result; and Justice Stevens for four dissenters-—
reflected
quite
different
understandings
of
the
“significant nexus” analysis that emerged from the
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC decisions. Each opinion
drew
dramatically different conclusions about the
scope of regulatory authority under the Act.218 Under any
of
their
approaches,
however,
the
agencies
must
regulate the discharge of pollutants into tributary
groundwater.
For the plurality, the “significant nexus” that
justified regulation of the wetlands in Riverside
Bayview required a “continuous surface connection” that
prevented the Corps from distinguishing between the
wetlands and the adjacent navigable waters.219 Justice
Scalia interpreted the result in Riverside Bayview as
turning on the Corps’ difficulty in determining the
exact point where waters ended and land began. 220
According to Scalia, the ambiguity between land and
water in Riverside Bayview was a necessary part of a
“significant nexus,”221 and that ambiguity was a function
of a continuous surface connection between the wetlands

214

Id. at 721–22.
Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 918,
921 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
216 United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2004);
Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704, 705 (6th Cir.
2004).
217 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 718, 730 (plurality opinion).
218 Id. at 746–51, 753–57; id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id.
at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 742.
220 Id. at 740 (“The difficulty of delineating the boundary between
water and land was central to our reasoning in [Riverside
Bayview].”).
221 Id. at 742 (“Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically
remote hydrologic connection to ‘waters of the United States’ do not
implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus
lack the necessary connection to covered waters that we described as
a ‘significant nexus’ in SWANCC.”).
215
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at issue and abutting waters.222 Therefore, a wetland is
subject to CWA regulation only where there exists a
continuous surface connection that blurs the line
between the wetland and a truly navigable water or its
tributary.223
The Court remanded the case to the lower court to
determine whether the wetlands at issue satisfied this
test.224 The plurality opinion might appear to undermine
the argument that hydrologically connected groundwater
must be regulated under the Act. A definition of
“significant nexus” requiring a “continuous surface
connection”
could
perhaps
preclude
regulation
of
groundwater.225 However, as we discuss below, other
courts and the agencies have rightly embraced Justice
Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence, while mostly rejecting
the
plurality’s
suggestion
that
a
surface
water
connection was the exclusive means of determining CWA
jurisdiction.226
In contrast to the plurality’s focus on a continuous
surface connection, Justice Kennedy interpreted the
results in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC as a function
of whether there was a sufficient ecological link
between a wetland and a navigable water.227 He agreed

222

Id. at 740.
Id. at 742 (“Therefore, only those wetlands with a continuous
surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’
in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between
‘waters’ and wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such waters and covered by
the Act.” (emphasis in original)).
224 Id. at 757.
225 Id. at 742. Worth noting is that Justice Scalia’s opinion
offered a novel distinction between the waters regulated by the Act’s
402 program and the 404 program. Id. at 744 n.11. Although dicta, the
distinction suggested that the plurality might come to a different
conclusion where groundwater and section 402 are involved. Id.
According to Justice Scalia, dredged and fill material regulated
under section 404 “does not normally wash downstream,” and can only
reach “navigable waters” via direct discharge. Id. at 744.
Consequently, there is no basis to regulate the discharge of dredged
or fill material into waters that are neither themselves navigable
nor intertwined with a navigable water such that it is difficult to
distinguish between the two. Id. Section 402, on the other hand,
regulates the discharge of pollutants that are often capable of being
carried downstream with the current. Id. at 744, n.11. Thus, the
Court seemed to approve of an assertion of CWA jurisdiction over
discharges of pollutants that are made indirectly into the navigable
surface waters. Id. at 743.
226 See infra notes 273–289 and accompanying text.
227 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223
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that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling should be vacated, but
disagreed as to the applicable test.228 In Justice
Kennedy’s view, the “significant nexus” test embraced
and unified the various iterations of the “downstream
effects”
analysis.229
He
rejected
the
plurality’s
insistence that the basis of the Riverside Bayview
decision was the difficulty in delineating the point at
which the river stopped and the wetland began. 230
Instead, Kennedy interpreted Riverside Bayview to hing
on
“the
Corps’
ecological
judgment
about
the
relationship
between
waters
and
their
adjacent
wetlands.”231 This relationship “provide[d] an adequate
basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may
be defined as waters under the Act.”232 In fact, the
Court applied this interpretation of Riverside Bayview
in SWANCC.233 According to Kennedy, the SWANCC Court
rejected the Corps’ assertion over isolated ponds not
simply because there was no surface connection, but
because unlike the connection present in Riverside
Bayview, the isolated ponds had no significant nexus to
a jurisdictional water.234
Kennedy proceeded to explain that the “significant
nexus” necessary for CWA jurisdiction was a function of
of the statute’s goals and purposes:to “restore and
maintain
the
chemical,
physical,
and
biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”235 In his view,
wetlands are subject to CWA regulation if they “either
alone
or
in
combination
with
similarly
situated
[wet]lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered
waters
more
readily
understood
as

228

Id. at 759.
Id. at 770 (indicating that the CWA is “a statute concerned with
downstream water quality”). The search for nexus is a hallmark of
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence. See generally Michael C. Blumm &
Sherry Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property, States’
Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667 (2007)
(examining Justice Kennedy’s opinion in all environmental cases in
which he wrote).
230 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
231 Id. at 766 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 134
(1985)).
232 Id. at 766.
233 See supra Part IV.B.
234 Rapanos, 547 U.S at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235 Id. at 779 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
229
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‘navigable.’”236 Those effects must be more than merely
“speculative or insubstantial.”237 Consistent with the
“downstream
effects”
approach
to
determining
CWA
jurisdiction, Kennedy’s test turns on the effect that a
discharge will have on a traditional navigable or
interstate water. A surface connection may be part of
that analysis, but it is not necessary.
Like
Justice
Kennedy,
the
four-member
dissent
rejected the plurality’s claim that the Riverside
Bayview
opinion
required
a
continuous
surface
connection between a wetland and a navigable water or
its tributary in order to be jurisdictional. 238 The
dissent chided both the plurality and Justice Kennedy
for failing to give the Corps the proper level of
deference in its interpretation of the CWA.239 In the
dissent’s view, the Corps’ decision to treat wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries as
“waters of the United States” was “a quintessential
example of the Executive’s reasonable interpretation of
a
statutory
provision.”240
Therefore,
the
Corps’
interpretation was due the high level of deference
called for by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.241 Employing that deferential
approach, the dissent would uphold CWA jurisdiction
over all wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or their
tributaries, including the subset of adjacent wetlands
satisfying Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.242
After
Rapanos,
most
courts
have
ruled
that
hydrologically connected groundwater is subject to CWA
regulation.243 For example, in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v.
236

Id. at 780.
Id.
238 Id. at 793 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 788.
240 Id.
241 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (Where a gap or ambiguity exists in a
statute, “a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency. We have long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer[.]”); Rapanos,
547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 809 (“[I]t seems likely that evidence would
support [significant nexus] findings as to most (if not all) wetlands
adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters.”).
243 See, e.g., Coldani v. Hamm, No. Civ. S-07-660 RRB EFB, 2007 WL
2345016, at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); Hernandez v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 (D.P.R. 2009); Haw.
237
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County of Maui,244 the district court of Hawai’i decided
that the county violated the CWA by disposing municipal
wastewater into wells.245 Although deciding the case on
other grounds, the court recognized that groundwater
with a “substantial nexus with navigable-in-fact water”
may be a “water of the United States,” even if it does
not act as a conduit through which pollution flows into
surface waters.246 Similarly, the Eastern District of
California applied Justice Kennedy’s test in deciding
that groundwater is subject to CWA regulation when it
affects nearby surface waters of the United States to a
significant extent.247 As these decisions reflect, lower
federal courts have not interpreted Rapanos to reject
CWA
jurisdiction
over
groundwater
satisfying
the
“significant nexus” test. In fact, both the plurality
opinion and Justice Kennedy’s opinion provided support
for regulating tributary groundwater under the Act.
V. THE 2015 REGULATORY DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”
The fractured opinions in Rapanos failed to supply
clear guidance to EPA and the Corps concerning limits
on their authority.248 Under the approaches of either the
plurality
or
Justice
Kennedy’s
concurrence,
jurisdictional determinations for many bodies of water
must be made on case-specific bases.249 This requirement
Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 998 (D. Haw.
2014). But see Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798, 810 (E.D. N.C. 2014) (noting that the CWA
was not intended to cover groundwater, even where hydrologically
connected to navigable waters).
244 Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D.
Haw. 2014).
245 Id. at 1005.
246 Id. at 998.
247 Coldani, 2007 WL 2345016, at *7–8.
248 In fact, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer urged the
agencies to promulgate a clarifying rule. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757;
id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his Rapanos concurrence,
Roberts chided the Corps for failing to provide an interpretive rule,
and lamented the fact that “[l]ower courts and regulated entities
will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis,” with no
majority opinion to guide them. Id. at 757–58 (Roberts, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer anticipated future confusion in his
Rapanos dissent, and called on the Army Corps to draft new
regulations, “and speedily so.” Id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
249 Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean
Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188, 22,188 (proposed April 21, 2014)
(“The SWANCC and Rapanos decisions resulted in the agencies
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is costly and time-consuming, and it often leaves both
regulated
entities
and
the
public
uncertain
the
statute’s jurisdicitional reach.250 Attempt to provide
clarity
and
consistency,
in
2015
the
agencies
promulgated a new definition of “waters of the United
States” aimed at implementing the ambiguous Rapanos
opinions.251
A. The New Regulations
On June 29, 2015, EPA and the Corps jointly
promulgated a definition of “waters of the United
States.”252
The
rule
created
three
categories
of
jurisdictional waters: 1) those that are always “waters
of the United States,” including traditional navigable
waters, interstate waters, territorial seas, and their
tributaries (which we call “Category 1 waters”); 2)
other waters for which jurisdiction may be established
on a case-specific basis, depending on the presence or
lack of a “significant nexus” to a Category 1 water
(“other
waters”);
and
3)
those
waters,
like
groundwater,
that
are
always
excluded
from
jurisdiction, regardless of any “significant nexus” to
a Category 1 water.253 We think the unmooring of the
latter waters from the “significant nexus” test is
unlawful. Under the rule, for the first time, the
federal government formally denied CWA jurisdiction
over tributary groundwater with significant effects on
jurisdictional waters.254

evaluating the jurisdiction of waters on a case-specific basis far
more frequently than is best for clear and efficient implementation
of the CWA.”).
250 Id. (“This [case-specific] approach results in confusion and
uncertainty to the regulated public . . .”).
251 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057 (“In this final rule, the
agencies are responding to those requests . . . to make the process
of identifying waters protected under the CWA easier to understand,
more predictable, and more consistent with the law and peer-reviewed
science.”).
252 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054. The rule quickly became the
subject of at least nine lawsuits brought by state governments and
industry. See supra note 11.
253 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058–59.
254 See infra note 337 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
previous EPA or Corps policies regarding groundwater regulation under
the CWA).
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The rule established seven groups of waters that are
subject to regulation as “waters of the United
States.”255 The first six are jurisdictional under any
circumstance.256 These include 1) traditional navigable
waters, 2) interstate waters, 3) the territorial seas,
4) impoundments of “waters of the United States,” 5)
tributaries to any of these waters, and 6) all waters
adjacent257 to any of these waters.258 Traditional
navigable
waters,
interstate
waters,
and
the
territorial seas are within Congress’s traditional
Commerce Clause authority to regulate navigation.259 The
agencies included the latter three categories based on
their “determination that the nexus [to the waters in
the first three categories], alone or in combination
with other of these covered tributaries or covered
adjacent waters in the watershed, is significant.” 260 To
make
that
determination,
the
agencies
explicitly
adopted and applied Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test.261
EPA
and
the
Corps
also
applied
Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” test to a seventh group of waters.262

255

2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073.
Id.
257 Id.
The agencies defined “adjacent” to mean “bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring.” Id. at 37,080. “Neighboring,” in turn,
included all waters both within the 100-year floodplain of a Category
1 water and wholly or partially within 1,500 feet of the ordinary
high water mark of that Category 1 water. Id. at 37,081. These
spatial criteria were not included in the agencies’ proposed rule,
and their addition is among the bases for suits challenging the Clean
Water Rule. See the cases cited supra note 11.
258 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,080.
259 See
generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 193 (1824)
(establishing that the Commerce Clause power includes the power to
regulate navigable waters); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563–64
(1870) (holding that navigable waters subject to Commerce Clause
regulation are those that are “navigable in fact”—meaning, they are
capable of being used as part of a “continued highway for
commerce . . . with other States and with foreign countries[.]”).
260 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073.
261 Id. at 37,075 (both impoundments and tributaries of Category 1
waters “affect the chemical, physical, [and] biological integrity of
downstream traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, [or] the
territorial seas”); id. at 37,084 (“adjacent” waters “are integrally
linked to the chemical, physical, or biological function of waters to
which they are adjacent[.]”); see also supra notes 235–237 and
accompanying text (describing Kennedy’s view of the “significant
nexus” test).
262 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,087.
256
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These “other waters” do not fit within any of the
groups that are always jurisdictional,263 but the
agencies included them as potential jurisdictional
waters “where a case-specific determination has found a
significant nexus between the water and traditional
navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial
seas.”264 These case-by-case determinations will be a
function of the effects that these “other waters” have
on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
a downstream Category 1 water.265
The problem with the regulations lies in the third
class of waters—-those that are categorically excluded
from CWA regulation under all circumstances.266 The
regulations prevent the agencies from asserting CWA
jurisdiction over these waters, even where there exists
a significant nexus to a Category 1 water that would
justify regulating a wetland or any other water.267 Some
subcategories of these waters were effectively excluded
from CWA jurisdiction in agency guidance documents,
like prior converted cropland, waste treatment systems,
and many normal farming practices.268 The 2015 rule
explicitly excluded these waters from regulation,
including all groundwater.269

263 The proposed rule would have included in this group all waters
not among the waters categorically included or excluded from CWA
jurisdiction. Id. at 37,086. The final rule, however, limited “other
waters” to 1) five subcategories of waters that are deemed “similarly
situated,” and so should be subject to a significant nexus assessment
“in combination with all waters of the same subcategory in the
region[,]” or 2) waters “located within the 100-year floodplain of a
[Category 1 water] . . . or within 4,000 feet of the high tide line
or ordinary high water mark of a [Category 1 water].” Id. at 37,087
(emphasis added). The final rule’s addition of these two limitations
on “other waters” is among the bases for the ongoing lawsuits
challenging the Clean Water Rule. See supra note 11.
264 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073.
265 Id. at 37,086.
266 Id. at 37,073.
267 Id.
at 37,096 (“[A]ll waters and features identified in
paragraph (b) as excluded will not be ‘waters of the United States,’
even if they otherwise fall within one of the categories in
paragraphs (a)(4) through (a)(8).”).
268 Id.
269 Id.; see also infra note 337 and accompanying text (discussing
the lack of any official EPA or Corps policy regarding groundwater
regulation).
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B. The Adoption of the “Significant Nexus” Test
The agencies wisely chose to adopt Justice Kennedy’s
version of the “significant nexus” test to determine
whether they have CWA jurisdiction over tributaries to
Category 1 waters, waters adjacent to Category 1
waters, and “other waters.”270 The Supreme Court provided
some advice to lower courts grappling with decisions
like Rapanos in Marks v. United States,271 where the
Court stated, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.’”272 This small bit of direction has been at the
heart of other courts’ attempts to make sense of the
splintered Rapanos decision.
In deciding how to apply the Rapanos opinions, most
courts have either employed the Supreme Court’s advice
in Marks and concluded that Justice Kennedy’s test
prevails, or decided that Marks is inapplicable, and
thus either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s tests
can provide a basis for CWA jurisdiction. For example,
the Fifth Circuit took the former approach in United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc.,273 deciding that the
“narrowest grounds” were the ones least restrictive of
federal
authority
to
regulate.274
Because
Justice
Kennedy’s approach allowed the agencies to continue to
assert jurisdiction over more waters than would the
plurality’s, Kennedy’s test was therefore “narrower,”

270 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056 (“An important element of the
agencies’ interpretation of the CWA is the significant nexus
standard” developed in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, “and refined in
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos.”); id. at 37,091 (“Paragraph
(c)(5) of the rule defines the term ‘significant nexus’ to mean a
significant effect (more than speculative or insubstantial) on the
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a traditional
navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.”); see
also supra note 227–237 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Kennedy’s definition of “significant nexus”).
271 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
272 Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976)).
273 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
274 Id. at 724.
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and thus should control.275 Other circuits have adopted
similar reasoning and reached similar conclusions.276
The latter approach—-that the agencies can establish
jurisdiction over waters by meeting either Rapanos
standard—-has also been adopted by a number of courts. 277
Most courts confronting the issue have recognized
Kennedy’s
test
as
a
sufficient
basis
for
CWA
jurisdiction,whether alone or under the plurality’s
test. The First Circuit’s inquiry in United States v.
Johnson is representative.278 The Corps filed suit
against a cranberry farmer, who allegedly violated the
CWA by discharging pollutants into wetlands without a
permit.279 The district court ruled in favor of the
government,280
applying
the
Marks
approach,
which
required determining which Rapanos opinion represented
the “narrowest grounds” of the decision.281 The court
observed that Marks “makes the most sense when two
opinions reach the same result in a given case, but one
opinion reaches that result for less sweeping reasons
275

Id. at 724–25.
See, e.g., N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d
993, 995 (9th Cir. 2007) (deciding, with little analysis, that “the
controlling opinion is that of Justice Kennedy”); United States v.
Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that
Kennedy’s opinion represents the “narrowest grounds” because it is
the “less far-reaching common ground.” Thus, “Justice Kennedy’s
‘significant nexus’ test provides the governing rule of Rapanos.”).
277 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006
WL 2221629, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006) (“[B]ecause both [Justice
Kennedy and the plurality] articulated different standards to be
applied on remand, it is not clear which standard is now
controlling. . . . Accordingly, consistent with Justice Stevens’
opinion, this Court will consider the jurisdictional requirement for
‘waters of the United States’ to be met if the affidavits satisfy
either [Rapanos test].”); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66
(1st Cir. 2006) (“The federal government can establish jurisdiction
over [wetlands] if it can meet either [Rapanos standard].”); United
States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Corps has
jurisdiction over wetlands that satisfy either the plurality or
Justice Kennedy’s test.”); see also United States v. Cundiff, 555
F.3d 200, 209–10 (6th Cir. 2009) (observing, like the other courts
mentioned in this note, that the Marks test is inapplicable to the
Rapanos opinions because no Rapanos opinion is a logical subset of
another. However, the court declined to decide which test controls
because either approach justified jurisdiction in that case.).
278 Johnson, 467 F.3d at 66.
279 Id. at 58.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 64. See supra note 272 and accompanying text for the
Marks test.
276
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than the other.”282 But the “narrowest grounds” rule is a
poor fit for situations like Rapanos, where neither the
plurality opinion nor Kennedy’s concurrence is a subset
of the other.283
The First Circuit decided that since Justice
Kennedy’s position would almost always command a
majority of the Supreme Court,284 this factor weighed in
favor of using Kennedy’s test except in the “bizarre”
situation in which there was a continuous surface
connection but no nexus significant enough to meet
Kennedy’s standard.285 In such an unlikely case, the
Rapanos dissent would join the plurality to vote 8–to–1
to uphold the agencies’ jurisdiction.286 To avoid such a
result, the First Circuit chose to allow the agencies
to demonstrate jurisdiction over wetlands based on
either Rapanos standard.287 That dual-test approach
“ensures that lower courts will find jurisdiction in
all cases where a majority of the [Supreme] Court would
support such a finding.”288 The court remanded the case
to allow the trial court to apply this new directive.289
In light of the substantial jurisprudence using
Justice Kennedy’s approach, EPA and the Corps seem
justified in basing their definition of “waters of the
United States” on his “significant nexus” standard. 290
The Rapanos plurality required that, in order for a
nonnavigable waterbody to be jurisdictional, it must be
relatively permanent and have a continuous surface
connection to a traditional navigable or interstate

282

Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
Id.
284 Id. (“If Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied, then at least
Justice
Kennedy
plus
the
four
dissenters
would
support
jurisdiction.”).
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 66.
290 The agencies referenced these cases in support of their decision
to adopt Justice Kennedy’s standard. See 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,056 (“The analysis used by the agencies has been supported by all
nine of the United States Courts of Appeals that have considered the
issue.”). But see United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F.
Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (relying on Fifth Circuit
precedent because the Rapanos Court failed to reach consensus, and
Justice Kennedy “failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’
required” by his test).
283
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water.291 Justice Kennedy’s ground for concurring in the
reversal of the Sixth Circuit required
jurisdictional
waters to have a significant effect on the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of traditional
navigable and interstate waters.292
Kennedy’s test will almost always include waters
having a continuous surface connection to a Category 1
water but can also include waters without a surface
connection with a significant nexus to traditional
navigable and interstate waters.293 Where Justice Kennedy
would uphold CWA jurisdiction, his position would enjoy
the
support
of
the
four
Rapanos
dissenters.294
Conversely, almost any waterbody failing Kennedy’s
significant nexus test would also fail to satisfy the
Rapanos plurality’s surface connection test.295 Thus,
Kennedy’s opinion will almost always enjoy the support
of
at
least
five
Justices,
and
the
agencies’
codification of it was quite appropriate.
VI. THE GROUNDWATER EXCLUSION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
By adopting Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus”
test, the agencies embraced a long line of cases
determining jurisdiction on the basis of the effect
that a water has on downstream waters.296 Many of those
cases applied the downstream effects analysis to

291

Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293 Id. at 772–73 (concluding that the Riverside Bayview and SWANCC
opinions did not require a surface-water connection).
294 The Rapanos dissent rejected the notion that CWA jurisdiction
required a continuous surface-water connection with “adjacent”
wetlands. Id. at 804 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent
would have upheld the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction based on the
agency’s “reasonable” conclusion that all adjacent wetlands have a
significant nexus to the adjacent waterbody. Id. at 805. This
expansive view of CWA jurisdiction would necessarily include waters
meeting Justice Kennedy’s version of the significant nexus test. See
supra note 242 and accompanying text.
295 There may be rare circumstances in which an adjacent water with
a surface connection to a jurisdictional water had no significant
effect, as required under Kennedy’s significant nexus test. See supra
Section IV.C. In such a case, the Rapanos dissenters would most
likely
join
with
the
Rapanos
plurality
in
validating
CWA
jurisdiction. See supra Section IV.C.
296 See cases cited supra note 111 (citing opinions in which courts
recognized or denied CWA jurisdiction based on the presence or
absence of downstream effects).
292
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groundwater,
and
either
held
or
suggested
that
tributary groundwater—that is, groundwater with a
hydrological connection to other covered waters—-is
subject to CWA regulation.297 The Supreme Court’s
decisions did note undermine those opinions, and in
fact refined the “downstream effects” analysis to base
it on the ecological interaction between nonnavigable
waters and downstream waters.298 Yet the agencies chose
to categorically exclude all groundwater from CWA
regulation.299
We
believe
that
this
decision
is
vulnerable to legal challenge.
A. The Arbitrary Exclusion of Groundwater
No final agency action under the CWA can be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”300 To decide
whether an EPA action is arbitrary, a reviewing court
must “determine whether the [agency] has considered the
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.”301 We think
that EPA and Corps failed to show that their decision

297 See, e.g., Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Train, No. 74–16, 1976 WL
23662, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 1976) (“Waters of the United
States. . .
includes
any
subsurface
waters
having
a
clear
hydrological nexus with those waters of the United States specified
[in EPA regulations].”); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975) (“Waters of the United States”
includes any waterway whose water “will ultimately end up in public
waters.”); United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) (denying jurisdiction where groundwater “ha[d] not been
alleged to flow into or otherwise affect surface waters”); Exxon
Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting
the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over isolated groundwater, but
explicitly withholding judgment as to connected groundwater).
298 See,
e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767, 779 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the SWANCC decision rested on the lack
of a “significant nexus,” and arguing the “significant nexus”
analysis should be made in consideration of the CWA’s goals and
purposes).
299 See supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
300 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
301 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Def. Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105–06 (1983) (paraphrasing Bowman Trans., Inc. v.
Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974)) (upholding
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s decision to exclude the effects
of storage of nuclear waste from the environmental analysis on a
decision to license a nuclear power plant).
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to categorically exclude all groundwater from CWA
regulation satisfied this requirement.
First, the agencies ignored the significant body of
case law requiring them to construe the CWA broadly so
as to fulfill the Act’s purpose. As discussed above,
the lower courts have overwhelmingly supported an
expansive interpretation of CWA jurisdiction.302 On the
basis of the statutory text and its legislative
history, those courts concluded that Congress intended
to
protect
navigable
and
interstate
waters
by
regulating the discharge of pollutants into waters that
feed into them.303 The Supreme Court validated those
conclusions in Riverside Bayview,
relying on the
“breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated
by the Act” to rule that the Corps’ “ecological
judgment about the relationship between waters and
their adjacent wetlands” provided an adequate basis for
including adjacent wetlands among the “waters of the
United
States.”304
By
categorically
excluding
all
groundwater from CWA regulation, the agencies’ 2015
rule applied a narrow interpretation of the Act’s reach
that conflicts with this line of cases and the Court’s
reasoning in Riverside Bayview.
Second, despite wisely choosing to adopt Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test for jurisdiction,
the agencies ignored Kennedy’s directive that the nexus
be “assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and
purposes.”305 Those purposes—-“to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters”306—-seem to require the agencies to
regulate discharges into waters that “significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of waters considered to be traditionally ‘navigable.’” 307
Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence concluded that
“functions such as pollutant trapping, flood control,
and runoff storage” sufficiently affected the integrity
of the nation’s waters to justify the Corps’ assertion
of jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands.308 Scientific
studies have overwhelmingly shown that groundwater
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

See supra Section III.B.
See supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text.
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 779–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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often performs these same functions to the benefit of
jurisdictional surface waters.
For example, numerous reports have demonstrated that
subsurface bodies of water can perform functions
similar to those of wetlands.309 Effective methods exist
to
measure
the
amount
of
interaction
between
groundwater and surface water and to observe the
related effects,310 and researchers have demonstrated
extensive interactions between ground and surface
waters.311 For instance, pollution discharged into
groundwater can and does migrate into connected surface
waters.312 In fact, according to California’s Department

309 See,
e.g., Geoscience Australia, Groundwater–Surface Water
Connectivity,
http://www.ga.gov.au/scientifictopics/water/groundwater/understanding-groundwaterresources/groundwater-surface-water-connectivity (last visited Apr.
9, 2016); Bergkamp & Cross, supra note 29, at 178 (discussing the
important role groundwater plays in maintaining ecosystem services).
310 Geoscience Australia, supra note 309 (“Assessing groundwater–
surface water interactions is complex and difficult. However, a range
of tools are available to assess the level of connectivity and
understand the processes which control the movement of water from
surface to sub-surface storages.”); see also Ron Aggs, Stream and
Groundwater
“Connectivity”
Analyzed,
AGRIC.
TODAY,
May
2010,
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/archive/agriculture-today-stories/ag-todayarchives/may-2010/stream-and-groundwater-connectivity-analysed
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2016) (recommending the use of heat as a tracer “to
determine which direction water is moving [between surface and
groundwater]”).
311 See, e.g., OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF
THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 2-14 (2015) (describing hydrological connection
between non-floodplain wetlands and groundwater under dry and wet
conditions). In fact, the interconnectivity of ground and surface
waters has been widely accepted in the context of water rights
allocationappropriation. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
845, cmt. b (1979) (“Most ground water is moving in the hydrologic
cycle. It originates from infiltration of precipitation and inflow of
streams; it discharges into springs, streams, lakes and oceans. Some
ground water is sidetracked from the cycle in closed basins where
geologic formations isolate it from recharge or discharge.”); see
also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Park Cty. Sportsmen’s Ranch, 45 P.3d 693,
702 (Colo. 2002) (“Colorado law contains a presumption that all
ground water is tributary to the surface stream unless proved or
provided by statute otherwise.” (citing Safranek v. Town of Limon,
228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951))).
312 Government
of
Canada,
Groundwater
Contamination,
https://www.ec.gc.ca/eau-water/default.asp?lang=En&n=6A7FB7B2-1 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2016) (“Several studies have documented the migration
of contaminants from disposal or spill sites to nearby lakes and
rivers
as
this
groundwater
passes
through
the
hydrologic
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of Water Resources, “[u]nder natural conditions, prior
to the pumping of groundwater from wells, streams are
the primary discharge outlet for groundwater. . . .
Groundwater discharge to streams provides the baseflow
of streams and is often a primary component of the
total
streamflow.”313
Little
wonder,
then,
that
groundwater “can influence the ecological properties of
[a] stream” and “can alter components of the stream
water—the
chemicals
it
carries,
flow
regime
and
dissolved oxygen content.”314 When groundwater performs
these
functions,
it
“significantly
affect[s]
the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered
waters
more
readily
understood
as
‘navigable.’”315 Whether caused by a surface tributary or
a subsurface one, the effect on the receiving water is
the same.
Comments
during
the
rulemaking
and
from
the
agencies’ scientific advisory body made clear the
important role that groundwater can play in the health
of surface waters. EPA asked its Science Advisory Board
(SAB)316 to review the scientific support for its
proposed rule and, in September 2014, the SAB issued a
report endorsing most of the technical and scientific
basis “for key components of the proposed rule,”
including EPA’s intention to include all adjacent

cycle[.] . . . Once contaminants are in the groundwater, they
eventually reach rivers and lakes.”).
313 Cal.
Dep’t
of
Water
Res.,
Water
Interaction,
http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater
/groundwater_basics/gw_sw_interaction.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2016)
(emphasis added).
314 Aggs, supra note 310; see also Louise Heathwaite et al.,
Abstract of Implications of Groundwater Surface Water Connectivity
for Nitrogen Transformations in the Hyporheic Zone, LANCASTER UNIV.,
http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/en/projects/implications-ofground
water-surface-water-connectivity-for-nitrogen-transformations-in-thehyporheic-zone%2886
f4b701-ecf2-4ef4-b1c0-5e18ebe5b98f%29.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2016) (noting the “pollutant attenuating properties” ascribed by some
to the area where surface and subsurface waters meet).
315 Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
316 Congress
established the Science Advisory
Board in the
Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (2012), to “provide such scientific
advice as may be requested by the Administrator [or Congressional
science and environment committees].” Id. § 4365(a).
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waters and wetlands as “waters of the United States.” 317
Moreover, the SAB approved EPA’s application of the
“significant nexus” test to “other waters,” because
those
waters
“can
influence
downstream
waters,
particularly when considered in aggregate.”318 However,
the SAB challenged the exclusion of groundwater from
the proposed rule, concluding that the exclusion
“do[es] not have scientific justification.”319 To the
contrary, the report maintained that groundwater may
connect waters and wetlands in unseen ways and “can be
critical in supporting the hydrology and biogeochemical
functions of wetlands and other waters.”320 Public
comments on the proposed rule echoed the SAB’s
concerns,321 and numerous commenters took issue with the
categorical exclusion of groundwater, some referencing
a good deal of the case law discussed in this Article.322
Notably, the agencies also recognized the important
role groundwater can play in hydrologic connectivity.
The rule repeatedly justified regulating particular
types of surface waters by relying on their subsurface
connections to Category 1 waters.323 Yet, despite the
concerns clearly expressed by the SAB and the public,
and the agencies’ apparent recognition of the important
role groundwater can play in the health of surface

317 SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD
(SAB) CONSIDERATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL BASIS OF THE
EPA’S PROPOSED RULE TITLED “DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT” 1–2 (2014) [hereinafter SAB REPORT].
318 Id. at 3.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPONSE TO COMMENTS FOR THE CLEAN WATER RULE:
DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”–TOPIC 7: FEATURES AND WATERS NOT
JURISDICTIONAL 223–67 (2014) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO COMMENTS].
322 See, e.g., id. at 251, 259 (comments from the Center for
Environmental Law and Policy in opposition to the categorical
exclusion of groundwater).
323 See, e.g., 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,085 (justifying the
categorical inclusion of certain waters within 100 feet of a
jurisdictional water based, in part, on the “shallow subsurface
hydrology to the water to which they are adjacent”); id. at 37,086
(justifying the categorical inclusion of certain waters within 1,500
feet of the Great Lakes based, in part, on the “physical[]
connect[ion] to [the Great Lakes] by surface and shallow subsurface
flow”); see also RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 321, at 224 (“[W]hile
exclusions are not ‘waters of the United States,’ they can serve as a
hydrologic, nonjurisdictional connection that agencies would consider
when making case-specific significant nexus determinations.”).
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waters,324
they
failed
to
provide
a
meaningful
explanation
for
categorically
excluding
all
groundwater. Of course, the agencies need not adopt the
advice of commenters or their science advisors. 325
However, the agencies do have an obligation to respond
to relevant comments and explain why they chose not to
reject reasonable suggestions.326
In the Clean Water Rule and its accompanying
documentation, the agencies provided only conclusory,
boilerplate
responses
to
groundwater
comments,
repeatedly stating that the exclusion reflects the
agencies’ current practice and supplies clarity.327 The
meager
support
the
agencies
offered
for
this
“longstanding practice” was in a technical support
document on the rule328 in which the agencies erroneously
claimed that “[t]he courts which have considered the
issue generally agree that ‘waters of the United
States’ do not include groundwater.”329 The one case the

324 See generally RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 321 (explaining the
scientific and legal basis for regulating groundwater).
325 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-722, at 16 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3283, 3295 (The SAB “is intended to be advisory only.
The Administrator will still have the responsibility for making the
decisions required of him by law.”).
326 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“[T]he
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rulemaking through submission of [comments]. After consideration
of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose.”).
327 See, e.g., 2015 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059 (“These exclusions
reflect the agencies’ current practice, and . . . further[] the
agencies’ goal of providing greater clarity over what waters are and
are not protected under the CWA.”); id. at 37,073 (“The rule
excludes . . . groundwater, which the agencies have never interpreted
to be a ‘water of the United States’ under the CWA. Codifying these
longstanding practices supports the agencies’ goals of providing
greater clarity, certainty, and predictability for the regulated
public and regulators, and makes rule implementation clear and
practical.”); see also RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 321, at 223–67
(responding to comments concerning the exclusion of groundwater from
CWA jurisdiction); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR
THE CLEAN WATER RULE: DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES (May 27, 2015)
at 16, available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201505/documents/technical_support_document_
for_the_clean_water_rule_1.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT]
(“EPA has never interpreted ‘waters of the United States’ to include
groundwater.”).
328 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 327, at 17.
329 Id. at 16.
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document cited in support of this assertion was a
district court decision, Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma.330
This case, years before Rapanos, hardly overcomes the
substantial body of case law supporting inclusion of
groundwater with a significant nexus to jurisdictional
surface waters as “waters of the United States.”331 Not
only have numerous federal courts suggested that a
groundwater tributary to a jurisdictional water is a
“water of the United States,”332 but the agencies seem to
misunderstand the Bosma decision. Far from supporting
the exclusion of all groundwater from the “waters of
the United States,” the Bosma court merely came to the
“unremarkable” conclusion that isolated groundwater was
not jurisdictional, while observing that “discharges
into
hydrologically
connected
groundwater
which
adversely affect surface water” were within the scope
of the Act.333
In addition to Bosma, the technical support document
cited legislative history of Congressman Aspin’s failed
attempt to amend the Act to bring “ground water into
the subject of the bill.”334 But, as discussed above, the
failure of proposed legislation hardly overcomes the
substantial support for including groundwater with a
significant nexus to jurisdictional waters as “water of
the United States.”335 Nowhere did the agencies explain
why they chose to cherry-pick the Bosma opinion and the
legislative history on Aspin amendment, while ignoring
the considerable body of law contrary to their position
on groundwater.
The
agencies’
claim
that
the
exclusion
of
groundwater reflected longstanding policy is quite

330

Id. (citing Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169
(D. Idaho 2001)).
331 See
supra note 297 (providing examples of opinions tying
groundwater jurisdiction to downstream effects); see also supra Part
III.C (explaining Rapanos and its importance).
332 See supra Part III.B.
333 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (“[T]he interpretive history of the CWA
only supports the unremarkable proposition with which all courts
agree—that
the
CWA
does
not
regulate
‘isolated/nontributary
groundwater’ which has no effect on surface water. It does not
suggest that Congress intended to exclude from regulation discharges
into hydrologically connected groundwater which adversely affect
surface water.”).
334 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 327, at 16–17; supra note 148
and accompanying text (citing to the remarks of Senator Aspin).
335 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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questionable. Neither EPA nor the Corps has ever
promulgated
a
formal
policy
on
groundwater
jurisdiction.336 Moreover, the unofficial statements on
groundwater made by the agencies relied on conflicting
policies. For example, EPA has taken the position in
litigation that it does not have authority to “regulate
subsurface disposal directly,”337 but in a rulemaking it
has implied that tributary groundwater is subject to
CWA regulation.338 Such conflicting expressions do not
demonstrate that the agencies have adopted and abided
by an conssistent groundwater policy.
Although EPA and the Corps asserted that all
groundwater was categorically excluded from the “waters
of the United States,” they also claimed that the
discharge of pollutants into groundwater that is
hydrologically
connected
to
jurisdictional
surface
waters does require a CWA permit.339 Citing only a
district court decision, Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v.
County of Maui, the agencies maintained that, although
groundwater is not subject to the “significant nexus”
test and therefore cannot be a “water of the United
States,” discharges into groundwater can be regulated
under Sections 402 and 404 of the Act where the
groundwater has a “direct hydrologic connection” to
jurisdictional
surface
waters.340
This
bifurcated
336 See Umatilla Water Quality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith
Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (D. Or. 1997) (“EPA
itself has never promulgated a formal regulation nor issued formal
guidance
interpreting
the
CWA
to
include
regulation
of
groundwater.”).
337 Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1319 (5th Cir. 1977).
338 National
Pollutant
Discharge
Elimination
System
Permit
Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg.
47,990, 47,997 (Nov. 16, 1990) (“[T]his rulemaking only addresses
discharges to waters of United States, consequently discharges to
ground waters are not covered by this rulemaking (unless there is a
hydrological connection between the ground water and a nearby surface
water body[)].” (emphasis added)).
339 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 327, at 17 (“[It is] agency
interpretation that discharges of pollutants to ‘waters of the United
States’ via groundwater with a direct hydrologic connection to
surface waters [are] to be subject to the CWA.”).
340 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 327, at 17 (citing Haw.
Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Haw. 2014),
discussed supra note 244 and accompanying text). Some courts have
suggested that tributary groundwater is a “point source” as defined
by the CWA. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., No.
2:15cv112, 2015 WL 6830301, at *9 (E.D. Va. 2015) (rejecting
defendant’s
motion
to
dismiss
and
suggesting
that
tributary

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700423

PREAUTHOR.BLUMM (DO NOT DELETE)

386

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

8/8/2016 8:49 AM

[Vol. 46:2

interpretation of the scope of CWA jurisdiction had no
basis in the text of the Act and completely ignores the
Supreme Court’s opinions in Rapanos.
Nowhere in the Clean Water Rule, the accompanying
technical support document, or the response to public
comments did the agencies cite any support in the Act
or the case law for this dichotomous interpretation of
CWA jurisdiction. The CWA makes waters subject to
section 402 and 404 regulation only when they are
“waters of the United States.”341 As the Supreme Court
has made clear, a waterbody is a “water of the United
States” when it has a “significant nexus” to a
traditionally navigable water or interstate water. 342
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test did not base
CWA jurisdiction on the mere presence of a hydrologic
connection. Instead, it asked whether the water at
issue “significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity” of Category 1 waters,343 and a
majority
of
the
Court
rejected
the
plurality’s

groundwater meets the statutory definition of “point source”). See
also CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012) (prohibiting “the discharge of
any pollutant” without a permit); id. § 1362(12) (defining “discharge
of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source”). In Hawaii Wildlife Fund, the court concluded
that discharges into groundwater required a CWA permit where the
groundwater acted as a “conduit” through which pollution flowed into
the ocean. 24 F. Supp. 3d at 994–95. However, that court also
concluded that groundwater “with a substantial nexus with navigablein-fact water may itself be protected under the Clean Water Act even
if it is not necessarily a conduit for pollutants.” Id. at 998. Far
from providing support for the exclusion of groundwater, the District
of Hawaii recognized that groundwater is subject to the “significant
nexus” test, like any other waterbody. Id. The agencies failed to
explain why they chose to cite only one portion of the Hawaii
Wildlife Fund opinion, while ignoring the portion that contradicts
their position. See supra notes 244–246 and accompanying text.
341 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
342 Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 755 (2006) (plurality opinion). The
Rapanos plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed that the “significant
nexus” test controls. Id. The plurality explained that “[w]etlands
are ‘waters of the United States’ if they bear the ‘significant
nexus’ of physical connection, which makes them as a practical matter
indistinguishable from waters of the United States.” Id. at 755
(emphasis in original). Justice Kennedy explained that “to constitute
‘navigable waters’ under the Act, a water or wetland must possess a
‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or
that could reasonably be so made.” Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 172 (2001). The two
opinions disagreed as to what constituted such a nexus. Id.
343 Id. at 780; see supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text.
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requirement of a surface water connection.344 PostRapanos, there are just two approaches to determine CWA
jurisdiction:
1)
by
satisfying
Justice
Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” test or 2) by satisfying the
Rapanos plurality’s “significant nexus” test.345 The
agencies clearly understood the requirements of Justice
Kennedy’s test, applying those standards to adjacent
waters, tributaries, and “other waters.”346 Yet they
chose to treat groundwater differently from other
potentially jurisdictional waters, and they failed to
explain the reasoning for this seemingly arbitrary
distinction.
EPA and the Corps’ failure to adequately respond to
comments critical of their exclusion of groundwater
supports
our
contention
that
the
exclusion
was
arbitrary and capricious. A rule is arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act347 if
the agency has not “considered the relevant factors and
articulated a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.”348 Failing to adequately
respond to relevant and significant comments shows that
“the agency’s decision was not based on a consideration
of the relevant factors.”349 An adequate agency response
must “explain how the agency resolved any significant
problems raised by the comments, and . . . show how
that resolution led the agency to the ultimate rule.” 350
Simply stating that in the past the agencies have never
considered groundwater to be a “water of the United

344

See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 273–289 and accompanying text (discussing lower
courts’ interpretations of Rapanos).
346 See supra Section V.B.
347 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335,
5372, 7521 (2012).
348 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 105 (1983) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974)).
349 Lilliputian Sys., Inc. v. Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety
Admin., 741 F.3d 1309, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
omitted) (remanding to allow the defendant agency to remedy its
failure to adequately respond to comments); see also Am. Mining Cong.
v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The
failure to respond to comments is grounds for reversal only if it
reveals that the agency’s decision was not based on consideration of
the relevant factors.”).
350 State of Mich. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 186 (6th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Action on Smoking & Health v. C.A.B., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
345
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States,” and offering only a confusing, manufactured
distinction between groundwater and surface waters
hardly shows that the agencies seriously considered
either the public comments or the implications of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Riverside Bayview, SWANCC,
and Rapanos.
B. The Groundwater Exclusion and Chevron Deference
To show that the exclusion of groundwater under the
Clean Water Rule is arbitrary and capricious, a
challenger will have to overcome the substantial
deference that a reviewing court may give to the
agencies’ rule. In the leading case of Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Chevron),351
the Supreme Court held that when an agency interprets a
statute that Congress tasked it with administering, a
reviewing court must first determine whether the
relevant statutory provision is ambiguous and, if so,
whether the agency’s interpretation of that provision
“is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”352 So long as the agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous statute is a reasonable one, the court is not
to disturb the agency’s decision, even if the court
disagrees with it.353
Although a good deal of Chevron analysis has focused
on the ambiguity of the statute (Step One) and the
reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation (Step
Two), a growing body of case law has asked a threshold
question often referred to as Chevron Step Zero.354 The
foundation of Chevron deference is the concept of
delegation: an agency may use rulemaking only to “fill
in the gaps” of a statute if Congress has delegated
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842–43.
353 Id. at 844 (explaining that where a statutory provision is
ambiguous, “a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency”). For Justice Scalia’s discussion of the
development of the Chevron doctrine, see Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511
(1989). See also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (discussing in great depth the
principles that emerged from the Chevron decision and its effect on
the post-Chevron world).
354 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191
(2006).
351
352
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that authority to the agency.355 But Chevron recognized
that Congress may expressly or implicitly delegate
interpretive authority to an agency.356 At Chevron Step
Zero, a reviewing court asks whether Congress has
indeed delegated to the agency the authority to
interpret the provision at issue, and thus whether the
Chevron framework applies to the dispute.357
One important Step Zero inquiry requires courts to
ask
whether
a
“fundamental
issue”
is
involved,
suggesting that Congress did not intend to delegate to
the
agency
the
authority
to
apply
its
own
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase.358 The

355 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct.
1863, 1868 (2013) (“Chevron is rooted in a background presumption of
congressional intent: namely, that Congress, when it left ambiguity
in a statute administered by an agency, understood that the ambiguity
would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the
agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever discretion the
ambiguity allows.”) (internal quotations omitted).
356 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit.”).
357 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 354, at 191. (“[I]n the last
period, the most important and confusing questions have involved
neither step [one or two]. Instead they involve Chevron Step Zero—the
initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all.”);
Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 753, 759 (2014) (Step Zero developed in response to judicial
“suggest[ions] that any time Congress has left a gap or ambiguity in
a statute administered by an agency this should be viewed as an
‘implied delegation’ of interpretative authority to the agency, and
that this entitles the agency to deference.”).
358 Commenters and courts have increasingly discussed another Step
Zero inquiry, which asks whether Congress intended to delegate to the
agency the authority to promulgate regulations with the force of law.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 354, at 193; Mary Holper, The New
Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
1241, 1242 (2011) (arguing that a U.S. Department of Justice ruling
should not receive Chevron deference because it was not made “with
the force of law”); Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The
Rest is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and
Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497 (discussing the evolution
of the Chevron doctrine, including the emergence of the “force of
law” factor). Chevron Steps One and Two burden only regulations
adopted pursuant to such law-making authority. See, e.g., Christensen
v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as
those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which
lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”);
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We hold
that
administrative
implementation
of
a
particular
statutory
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Supreme Court has long hinted at this threshold
question,359 but recent opinions have discussed this
prerequisite
in
more
explicit
terms,
arguably
establishing Step Zero as an essential part of the
Chevron doctrine.360 In those cases, the Court declined
to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute
where the interpretation involved questions of “deep
economic and political significance” that are “central
to
[the]
statutory
scheme,”
like
the
continued

provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”). The Supreme Court has said that Congress has delegated
such authority where it authorizes agency rulemaking through noticeand-comment procedures. Id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally
that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of
law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie
a pronouncement of such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our
cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of noticeand-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.” (internal citations
omitted)). The Clean Water Rule, promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking, is therefore clearly subject to Chevron analysis.
359 See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 234
(1994), superseded by statute, Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (affirming the
D.C. Circuit’s rejection of a Federal Communications Commission rule
that exempted all carriers but AT&T from rate-filing requirements).
At first glance, the opinion appeared to be a typical Step 1
decision, but the Court suggested that Congress would not delegate to
an agency the authority to make such dramatic changes to an important
aspect of the relevant statute. Id. at 231. It is “highly unlikely,”
Justice Scalia wrote for a 6–3 majority, “that Congress would leave
the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even
substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion[.]” Id. See also
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
160 (2000) (rejecting the Food and Drug Administration’s attempt to
regulate tobacco under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act based, at least
in part, on the fact that the Court was “confident that Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion”).
360 For the most recent example, see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480, 2483 (2015) (foregoing Chevron analysis and instead upholding
the Internal Revenue Service’s policy of providing tax credits to
customers who purchase insurance through the Affordable Care Act’s
federal exchange, based on the Court’s own interpretation of the
provision at issue); see also supra note 355 and accompanying text
(citing City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863,
1868 (2013)).
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viability of a national health care law.361 The Clean
Water Rule, on the other hand, does not appear to rise
to the same level of significance, either economically
and politically, or in terms of its centrality to the
statutory scheme of the CWA.362 Consequently, the
agencies’ decision to exclude all groundwater from CWA
regulation will likely be subject to Chevron Steps One
and Two.
The statutory phrase “waters of the United States”
is almost certainly ambiguous.363 The amount of debate
about the meaning of the phrase in courts and law
review
commentary
makes
the
ambiguity
abundantly
clear.364 In Chevron, after establishing that the

361 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“Whether [the ACA’s tax] credits are
available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep economic
and political significance that is central to this statutory scheme;
had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely
would have done so expressly.” (internal quotations omitted)).
362 Unlike the rule at issue in King v. Burwell, for example, the
agencies’ view on their jurisdiction over tributary groundwater would
not unravel the entire CWA statutory structure. See id. at 2484.
363 See, e.g., Thomas L. Casey, Reevaluating “Isolated Waters”: Is
Hydrologically Connected Groundwater “Navigable Water” Under the
Clean Water Act?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 159, 160 (2002) (“Since its enactment
in 1972, courts have struggled with determining the proper
interpretation of ‘navigable waters’ under the Clean Water Act.”);
Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning With Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the
United States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO.
ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2006) (“Rapanos v. United States is the
latest episode in the serial effort to identify the precise meaning
of ‘waters of the United States.’”); Scott Snyder, Comment, The Waste
Treatment Exclusion and the Dubious Legal Foundation for the EPA’s
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 504,
504 (2014) (“The precise scope of ‘waters of the United States’ is
constantly in flux, as environmentalists advance a more expansive
view, while industry interests support a narrower interpretation.”).
Thus, the Supreme Court has typically considered the lawfulness of
agency interpretations of “waters of the United States” in the
context of the Chevron doctrine. See, e.g., Riverside Bayview, 474
U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (“[O]ur review is limited to the question
whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and
legislative history of the Act for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction
over” the wetlands at issue.); Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 716 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (applying Chevron doctrine, but finding the
Corps’ interpretation unreasonable); id. at 717 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (necessarily implying that “waters of the United States”
is ambiguous by concluding that his “significant nexus” test was the
way to resolve that ambiguity).
364 See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 716, 717 (plurality opinion);
see also supra note 33 (citing examples of articles debating the
CWA’s application to groundwater).
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statutory
text
was
ambiguous,
the
Court
sought
unsuccessfully to find clarity in the Clean Air Act’s365
legislative history.366 As in Chevron, an inquiry into
the CWA’s legislative history is unlikely to resolve
the ambiguity of “waters of the United States.” As
discussed above, the legislative history regarding
groundwater regulation is inconclusive.367 Consequently,
a court is likely to go beyond Chevron Step One in its
review of the Clean Water Rule.
A challenge to the Clean Water Rule at the Chevron
Step Two stage will most likely succeed. The agencies’
failure to consider the case law recognizing CWA
jurisdiction
over
tributary
groundwater,368
their
inconsistent
application
of
Justice
Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” test369 and their cursory explanation
for excluding groundwater,370 all suggest that their
interpretation of “waters of the United States” is
unreasonable, and thus should receive no judicial
deference. Moreover, the interpretation is contrary to
the purposes of the CWA.371 Although the Clean Air Act’s
legislative history failed to resolve the ambiguity in
the statutory text, the Chevron Court took note of what
the history showed of the policy concerns “that
motivated the enactment” of the Clean Air Act and
assessed the agency’s interpretation of the statute in
that context.372 In reviewing the Clean Water Rule, a

365
366

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984) (discussing the Clean Air
Act’s legislative history and “agree[ing] with the Court of Appeals
that it is unilluminating”).
367 See,
e.g., supra notes 110, 195 and accompanying text
(discussing legislative history in the form of committee report
language supporting a broad interpretation of CWA jurisdiction). But
see supra text accompanying note 148 (discussing legislative history—
specifically the failed Aspin Amendment—suggesting that Congress
intended not to include groundwater in the “waters of the United
States”).
368 See supra notes 302–304 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 305–307 and accompanying text.
370 See supra notes 327–329 and accompanying text.
371 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) (providing that the CWA’s goal is
“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters”); see also supra note 14 and
accompanying text (noting that by excluding groundwater, the agency
jeopardizes the integrity of the nation’s waters).
372 U.S.A. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
863 (1984).
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court should make that same inquiry and find the
interpretation to be unreasonable.
The Chevron Court concluded that Congress’s two
purposes in passing the Clean Air Act were 1) the
prevention of significant economic harm resulting from
regulations that are imposed too quickly, and 2) the
swift reduction of air pollution and its harmful
environmental and societal effects.373 In Step Two of the
analysis, the Court decided that EPA’s “bubble rule”374
was consistent with the first of those concerns, and
consequently accepted EPA’s “reasonable explanation for
its
conclusion
that
the
regulations
serve
the
environmental objectives as well.”375 As with the Clean
Air Act in Chevron, the CWA’s legislative history does
not
resolve
the
text’s
ambiguous
definition
of
“navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.”376
Unlike Chevron, however, the policy concerns that
motivated Congress to enact the CWA are not served by—and in fact, undermine—-the agencies’ categorical
exclusion of groundwater from regulation.
As discussed above, Congress’s goal in enacting the
Act was “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”377 The justifications provided by the agencies
for the 2015 Clean Water Rule fail to explain how the
373

Id. at 851–52.
In areas not meeting ambient air quality standards, the Clean
Air Act prohibits new construction or modifications to major sources
of air pollution without a permit. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (2012). The
Act defines a major source as one emitting at least 100 tons per year
of any air pollutant. Id. § 7602(j). (EPA had interpreted that
definition to allow for multiple sources of pollution at a single
facility to be grouped within the same “bubble.”) See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 840. Under the agency’s “bubble” approach, a facility can
modify a particular source among many in a larger facility without
receiving a permit as long as the facility’s total emissions do not
increase. Id.
375 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 (“[T]he plantwide definition is fully
consistent with one of those concerns—the allowance of reasonable
economic growth—and, whether or not we believe it most effectively
implements the other, we must recognize that the EPA has advanced a
reasonable explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve
the environmental objectives as well.”).
376 See supra notes 147–157 and accompanying text.
377 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); see also United States v. Ashland
Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1371, 1321 (6th Cir. 1974) (“The
intention of Congress to eliminate or drastically reduce water
pollution throughout the waters of the United States is made clear in
many provisions of the Act[.]”).
374
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complete exclusion of groundwater from CWA regulation
serves the environmental objectives of the statute. We
think this lack of explanation makes the agencies’
interpretation
of
“waters
of
the
United
States”
unreasonable and the Clean Water Rule arbitrary and
capricious.
VII. CONCLUSION
Groundwater and surface water are functionally
interdependent parts of the hydrologic cycle.378 They are
not separate natural resources. Congress recognized the
interconnected nature of water when it enacted the
CWA.379 Almost immediately thereafter, federal courts
interpreted the Act’s broad purpose to apply to waters
beyond
those
that
are
traditionally
navigable,
including groundwater.380 Those early cases employed a
jurisdictional test that focused on the effect that a
nonnavigable water had on downstream navigable or
interstate waters.381 This same “downstream effects” test
was later embraced and refined into the “significant
nexus” test by the Supreme Court in cases like
Riverside Bayview,382 SWANCC,383 and Rapanos.384
In
the
2015
“waters
of
the
United
States”
regulations, EPA and the Corps embraced this test to
determine the jurisdictional status of surface waters
378 See,
e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., Water Interaction,
http://www.water.ca.gov/
groundwater/groundwater_basics/gw_sw_interaction.cfm
(last
visited
Apr. 9, 2016) (“Groundwater and surface water are essentially one
resource, physically connected by the hydrologic cycle.”); SAB REPORT,
supra note 317, at 3 (“The available science . . . shows that
groundwater connections, particularly via shallow flow paths in
unconfined aquifers, can be critical in supporting the hydrology and
biogeochemical functions of wetlands and other waters. Groundwater
also can connect waters and wetlands that have no visible surface
connections.”).
379 S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3742, 3743 (“Water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is
essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source.”); see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
380 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing early broad
judicial interpretations of CWA jurisdiction); see also supra notes
122,
124
and
accompanying
text
(discussing
early
judicial
interpretations applying CWA regulation to tributary groundwater).
381 See supra Part III.C.
382 See supra notes 164–169 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 196–199 and accompanying text.
384 See supra notes 218–223 and accompanying text.
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that are not interstate or navigable-in-fact.385 But the
agencies chose to contradict both the text of CWA and
the case law by not employing this well-established
test
to
determine
the
jurisdictional
status
of
groundwater. Because this dichotomy is contrary to the
statute, its legislative history, and relevant case
law, reviewing courts should demand that the agencies
revise their regulations. To fulfill the purpose of the
CWA, the agencies must protect the quality of the
nation’s waters by including groundwater among those
waters whose jurisdiction is dependent upon a casespecific
analysis
of
their
nexus
to
other
jurisdictional waters.

385

See supra notes 261–265 and accompanying text.
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